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This Article examines the surprisingly under-explored relationship between habeas corpus and due 
process, using ongoing detention at Guantanamo Bay as inroads into the broader topic.  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush held that the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause applies to detainees at Guantanamo, thus constitutionally protecting their filing of habeas 
petitions. Since that decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has affirmed its pre-
Boumediene conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not apply to Guantanamo detainees.  
This unusual severing of the typically dual protections of habeas review and due process raises the 
interesting question of how those two constitutional provisions relate.  This Article sets out five 
conceptions of the relationship between habeas and due process, then shows how each of those 
conceptions connects to a particular reading of Boumediene.  The Article concludes that, if and 
when the issue of the applicability of due process to Guantanamo reaches the Supreme Court, the 
Court’s conclusion may well come down to Justice Kennedy’s vote, which is likely to hinge on 
whether he applies to the issue the same “impracticable and anomalous” test that he utilized when 
writing the majority opinion in Boumediene or whether he approaches the issue from the 
separation-of-powers perspective that he also emphasized in that decision.  Which approach emerges 
as dominant has implications beyond Guantanamo:  it is likely to suggest a broader 
understanding of the still-uncertain relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses.  
Hence, the Article reveals that while the opinion in Boumediene initially appears susceptible to 
multiple, complementary readings, digging deeper so as to explore those readings’ implications for 
the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and due process reveals distinct tensions, 
as the different readings of Boumediene suddenly begin to pull in different directions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2008, one small piece of the Constitution traveled to 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  In Boumediene v. Bush,1 the Supreme Court 
held that the constitutional rights guaranteed under the Suspension 
Clause2 applied extraterritorially to aliens held at Guantanamo.  The 
 
 * For their help and support with this project, the author thanks Katherine Boone, Sophie 
Brill, Amy Chua, Travis Crum, Gene Fidell, Bob Geltzer, Linda Greenhouse, Albert Lichy, 
Sam Rascoff, Steve Vladeck, Matt Waxman, and especially Jed Rubenfeld, whose encou-
ragement and feedback helped me to formulate thoughts on this topic, to put them to 
paper, and to revise and refine them.  The author also thanks the editors of the Journal of 
Constitutional Law for their exceedingly dedicated work on this Article. 
 1 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).  
As others have explained, a major aspect of the outcome in Boumediene was the Court’s 
holding that there are affirmative rights guaranteed under the Suspension Clause.  See 
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Court’s opinion was decidedly narrow in multiple senses:  Justice 
Kennedy wrote on behalf of a five-to-four majority, and he made 
every effort to confine his opinion just to Guantanamo and, crucially 
for the discussion here, just to the Suspension Clause. 
Since Boumediene, uncertainty has reigned as to whether that deci-
sion portended other parts of the Constitution accompanying the 
Suspension Clause to Guantanamo, with the most likely next candi-
date being the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.3  This Article 
explains that, while the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held 
both before and after Boumediene that the Due Process Clause does 
not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, the logic of Boumediene itself 
suggests that, eventually, the Supreme Court may reach a different 
conclusion. 
This Article does not reopen the debate over whether Boumediene 
was decided rightly or wrongly.  Nor does it make a normative argu-
ment about whether, in the abstract, the Due Process Clause should 
apply to aliens detained at Guantanamo.  Rather, the Article tackles 
the narrow question of whether Boumediene is best understood to an-
ticipate such a finding or whether its narrowness suggests that extra-
territorial extension of the Suspension Clause to aliens was constitu-
tionally unique.  That inquiry demands broader consideration of a 
surprisingly under-explored topic:  the relationship between habeas 
corpus rights and due process protections. 
The Article begins by offering some background on Boumediene’s 
holding and by suggesting what is at stake in considering whether 
that holding anticipates a similar extension of the Due Process Clause 
to Guantanamo.  Next, the Article summarizes relevant pre-
Boumediene case law on due process at Guantanamo, after which the 
discussion turns to relevant language of Boumediene itself.  The Article 
then explores the post-Boumediene case law on the applicability of due 
process to Guantanamo detainees and surveys the scholarship on that 
subject that has emerged in the wake of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion. 
The next Part of the Article grapples with the relationship, in the 
abstract, between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause, 
offering five conceptions of how the two constitutional clauses relate 
to each other.  Finally, drawing on those different conceptions of the 
 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo:  The Boumediene Decision, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (discussing Boumediene’s holding “that the Suspension Clause af-
firmatively confers a right to habeas corpus review”). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law . . . .”). 
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habeas-due process relationship, the Article suggests five understand-
ings of Boumediene, ranging from those pointing most strongly against 
finding the Due Process Clause applicable to Guantanamo detainees 
to those that point most strongly in favor of such a finding.  In the 
end, the Article concludes that the Supreme Court’s determination 
may well come down to Justice Kennedy’s vote, which is likely to 
hinge on whether he applies to the issue the same “impracticable and 
anomalous” test that he utilized in Boumediene or whether he ap-
proaches the issue from the separation-of-powers perspective that he 
also emphasized in that decision.  Which approach emerges as domi-
nant has implications beyond Guantanamo:  it is likely to suggest a 
broader understanding of the still-uncertain relationship between the 
Suspension and Due Process Clauses.  Hence, while the opinion in 
Boumediene initially appears susceptible to multiple, complementary 
readings, digging deeper so as to explore those readings’ implications 
for the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and due 
process reveals distinct tensions, as the different readings of Boume-
diene suddenly begin to pull in different directions. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND AND THE STAKES 
A.  The Background:  The Suspension Clause at Guantanamo 
The Constitution’s Suspension Clause declares:  “The privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”4  
While the meaning of those scant words remains much debated,5 the 
 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 5 Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion), with id. at 554 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), and id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  See generally Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 537, 539 (2010) (“Among other things, [the Suspension Clause] does not define the 
content of the privilege or what amounts to a suspension, leaving them open to debate.”); 
id. at 558 (“[T]he constitutional text did not express its purpose clearly.”); David L. Sha-
piro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention:  Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 59  
  (2006) (“The Suspension Clause . . . is as straightforward as an English sentence can be.  
And to those familiar with the Great Writ, its meaning, at least at first reading, does not 
seem obscure.  Yet few clauses in the Constitution have proved so elusive.” (footnote 
omitted)); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 607  
(2009) (“We have come this far with much of the Clause’s meaning shrouded in mys-
tery . . . .”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941 
(2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:  FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 
(2010)) (noting the recent “unprecedented degree to which courts have had to grapple 
with the purpose, meaning, and scope of the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause” and 
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basic idea of the writ of habeas corpus is that a prisoner has the right 
to be brought before a judge in order to challenge the legality of the 
prisoner’s detention (or, less typically, to challenge the conditions of 
that detention).6  In turn, the Suspension Clause both affirms a pris-
oner’s right to challenge his detention and specifies that only in the 
narrow instances of rebellion and invasion may the writ be sus-
pended. 
While habeas cases make their way to the Supreme Court with 
some regularity, the Suspension Clause itself and the questions that it 
raises about what habeas and suspension really mean have been the 
focus of relatively few cases before the Court over the centuries.7  In 
the 1807 case of Ex parte Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall suggested 
that only Congress could constitutionally suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.8  In 1861, Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a federal circuit court 
judge, invoked Bollman in holding that President Lincoln’s suspen-
sion of habeas corpus without congressional approval was unconstitu-
tional.9  Then, in the famous 1866 case of Ex parte Milligan, the Su-
preme Court found Congress’s suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus during the Civil War to have been lawful in general, but 
deemed unconstitutional the use of military tribunals where civilian 
 
the fact that “contemporary judges and scholars have found little settled by prior 
precedent”). 
 6 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, 
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007) (“The mechanics of the writ’s 
administration have changed little over the centuries.  A representative of the detainee 
petitions a court to issue a writ directing the prisoner’s custodian (the ‘respondent’) to 
appear and to show lawful authority for the detention.  If the court finds the detention 
contrary to law, it can order the prisoner’s release.” (footnote omitted)); see also WILLIAM 
F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 6 (1980) (“The writ operates 
precisely as its English model:  the writ is directed to a person detaining another, com-
manding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, to state 
the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever 
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.”). 
 7 See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 963 (“[P]rior to 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court had consis-
tently declined to give meaningful substantive content to the Suspension Clause.  The 
provision was seldom even mentioned in most of the Court’s significant nineteenth-
century habeas decisions, and even when it was invoked . . . the discussion was, charitably, 
rather cursory.  Even in cases traditionally thought of as significant habeas decisions, the 
Suspension Clause received short shrift.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 8 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93, 94 (1807). 
 9 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149, 152 (1861) (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, 
J).  Note that some scholars contend that, in deciding Merryman, Chief Justice Taney was 
acting not as a circuit judge but as Chief Justice in chambers.  See, e.g., Special Event, The 
Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 351, 366–67 (1998) (show-
ing the “testimony” of Professor Mark E. Neely, Jr. supporting this view in a mock im-
peachment trial of President Lincoln). 
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courts were still operating.10  The Supreme Court’s most significant 
twentieth-century war-time decision relating to the Suspension Clause 
was 1948’s Hirota v. MacArthur, in which the Court rejected a Japanese 
war criminal’s attempt to seek a writ of habeas corpus directly from 
the Supreme Court based on its original jurisdiction.11  However, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Suspension Clause was unclear, as 
the Court’s decision left vague which of two jurisdictional defects 
proved fatal to the petitioner’s claims.12  Other significant twentieth-
century Supreme Court decisions implicating the Suspension Clause 
consistently avoided grappling with foundational issues regarding the 
meaning of the Clause itself.13 
While the Supreme Court’s Civil War-era decisions did invalidate 
certain executive actions, the Court had never struck down a federal 
statute on the basis of the Suspension Clause until the Court’s 2008 
decision in Boumediene.14  Two previous Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning Guantanamo, and two legislative responses by the political 
branches, provided the backdrop for Boumediene.15 
In 2004, faced with habeas petitions from detainees held at Guan-
tanamo, the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts 
possessed jurisdiction over Guantanamo.16  Congress and President 
Bush responded with the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which 
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from 
 
 10 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). 
 11 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948); see Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota:  
Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497 (2007) (discussing recent im-
plications of Hirota).  Another World War II-era case that implicated the Suspension 
Clause, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, was decided by the Court on statutory grounds, though 
Justice Murphy’s concurrence reached the constitutional issue and invoked Milligan’s 
understanding of suspension requirements.  327 U.S. 304, 328 (1946) (Murphy, J., con-
curring). 
 12 See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1518–22 (discussing the questions left unanswered in Hiro-
ta). 
 13 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (denying habeas relief while avoiding core issues 
surrounding the definition of the Suspension Clause); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 
(1977) (interpreting a statute to deny habeas relief while avoiding issues central to the 
meaning of the Suspension Clause); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (rul-
ing on a habeas petition without discussing the meaning of the Suspension Clause). 
 14 See Neuman, supra note 5, at 538 (“The Supreme Court had never before found a viola-
tion of the Suspension Clause, and the holding of Boumediene gives its reasoning a prece-
dential significance that earlier discussions lack.”). 
 15 Also significant was INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), in which the Supreme Court 
looked to the Suspension Clause in deciding that Congress had not intended to strip fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from deportable aliens. 
 16 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470, 485 (2004). 
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Guantanamo.17  A year later, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that the Act did not apply to habeas petitions already pending on the 
date of the law’s enactment.18  Yet again, Congress and President 
Bush rebuffed the Court, with the 2006 Military Commissions Act un-
ambiguously stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over any habeas 
petitions from Guantanamo, pending or otherwise.19 
The stage was set for the constitutional challenge that had been 
avoided by the Supreme Court through its statutory decisions in Rasul 
and Hamdan.  Confronted once again by lower courts’ dismissal of 
habeas petitions from Guantanamo, the Supreme Court faced square-
ly two questions in Boumediene:  did the Guantanamo petitioners pos-
sess a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and, if so, did the Detai-
nee Treatment Act provide an adequate and effective substitute in 
the form of combatant status review tribunals (“CSRTs”)? 
Writing for the Court’s five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy held 
first that the petitioners did indeed possess such a right, and second 
that the Act offered an inadequate substitute.20  The Court explained 
that, because the right to habeas review had full effect at Guantana-
mo, Congress had to comply with the Suspension Clause in order to 
suspend that right, yet Congress had neither enacted such a suspen-
sion nor provided an adequate substitute.21  Hence, the Supreme 
Court ordered lower courts to hear habeas petitions from detainees 
at Guantanamo, even as Kennedy’s opinion explicitly left uncertain 
the precise parameters of appropriate review.22 
 
 17 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e), 119 Stat. 3474, 3477 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)). 
 18 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 584 (2006). 
 19 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 7(a), 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2635, 2636 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).  Unlike the Detainee Treatment 
Act, which stripped habeas jurisdiction specifically from Guantanamo detainees, see De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1405(e) (“[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdic-
tion to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on be-
half of an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay . . . .”), the 2006 Military Commissions 
Act applied everywhere, see Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 950j (“[N]o court, justice, 
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action whatsoev-
er . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under this 
chapter . . . .”). 
 20 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). 
 21 Id. at 771, 792. 
 22 Id. at 733 (“We do not address whether the President has authority to detain these peti-
tioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue.  These and other questions regarding the 
legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”); id. 
at 798 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the content of the law that 
governs petitioners’ detention.  That is a matter yet to be determined.  We hold that peti-
tioners may invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”); see Melt-
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After seven years of post-9/11 detentions at Guantanamo and two 
previous Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Boumediene made 
clear that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied to non-
citizens held at Guantanamo:  “We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”23  What the decision 
meant for the rest of the Constitution’s applicability to Guantanamo 
remained an open question.24 
B.  The Stakes:  The Due Process Clause at Guantanamo 
One could ask many questions about the implications of Boume-
diene for the rest of the Constitution’s applicability to Guantanamo—
indeed, as many questions as there are other relevant guarantees con-
tained in America’s founding document.25  But one such question is 
particularly pressing:  does Boumediene’s application of the Suspension 
Clause to Guantanamo portend the similar application there of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?26 
 
zer, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that Boumediene raised “a broad range of questions, left to 
the future, about how the habeas jurisdiction will operate”). 
 23 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
 24 See Usman Ahmed, Prosecuting Torture Through the Lens of Boumediene 3 (Sept. 29, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684405 (arguing “that other constitutional provisions 
can pass the Boumediene test and should be extended to alien-detainees in the same way as 
habeas”).  The question of whether other constitutional rights applied to Guantanamo 
detainees had emerged even before Boumediene.  See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 
2093 (“Another looming question at the time of the Hamdan decision involved the pro-
cedural rights, if any, that Guantánamo detainees possess under the Due Process 
Clause.”); id. at 2094 (“[T]he question [then] becomes whether an alien seized abroad 
acquires procedural due process rights as a result of being relocated to Guantánamo 
Bay.”). 
 25 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory:  Access to Courts and the Separation of 
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2108 (2009) (asking, in the wake of Boumediene, “do 
other constitutional provisions ‘ha[ve] full effect’ at Guantanamo?” (quoting Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 771)).  One could also ask an important set of questions about the extraterri-
torial reach of the Suspension Clause beyond Guantanamo in the wake of Boumediene, but 
that is not this Article’s topic.  See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dis-
cussing the reach of the Suspension Clause); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial 
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009) (exploring ques-
tions raised in the wake of the “functional approach” adopted in Boumediene).  Maqaleh, in 
particular, raises the question of whether Boumediene is, in fact, geographically limited in 
its scope as suggested above, or whether its functional approach is decidedly unlimited, as 
the Maqaleh petitioners argue and as the district court initially found.  See Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 26 Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2011) (manuscript at 22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1838402 
(“Boumediene, . . . though not about the Due Process Clause, likely recalibrates the Court’s 
approach to whether all individual constitutional rights apply extraterritorially, including 
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The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees to indi-
viduals certain protections against the federal government:  “No per-
son shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”27  Because there exists a number of significant 
ways—explored below—in which the possible applicability of the 
Clause to Guantanamo detainees affects ongoing litigation,28 the Due 
Process Clause appears to be the part of the Constitution whose po-
tential to accompany the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo will con-
front the Supreme Court soonest.  In other words, the stakes already 
loom large. 
First, the D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals have followed 
Boumediene’s mandate to hear and decide habeas petitions from 
Guantanamo.29  Indeed, much as Boumediene anticipated, the lower 
courts appear to have worked out at least some standards on which to 
decide such cases, even if significant uncertainty remains.30  Among 
 
whether the Guantanámo detainees are entitled to due process protections.”); see Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, No. 11-7020 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/al-Madhwani.pdf 
(petitioning the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether the Court of Appeals’ denial of due 
process protections to Guantánamo Bay detainees is inconsistent with the law and the 
Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush”). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 28 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (“Due process doctrine subsists 
in confusion.  The disarray partly reflects the terrain that due process covers.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 29 Ironically, the literal meaning of habeas corpus—“may you have the body,” or “you 
should have the body”—has not applied to post-Boumediene habeas proceedings concern-
ing Guantanamo:  no “body” has actually been brought from Guantanamo into court, 
though some petitioners have participated in the proceedings via teleconference.  (On 
the literal meaning, see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 n.10 (1950).)  I appreciate 
Sophie Brill bringing this linguistic irony to my attention. 
 30 Cf. Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Decisions Detained:  The Courts’ Embrace of Complexity in Guan-
tánamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 94, 124 (2011) (“Hence, virtually the en-
tire string of major Guantánamo-related cases has traveled from the D.C. District Court to 
the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court, only to return to the district court with unans-
wered questions whose resolution by district court judges is inevitably challenged first be-
fore the D.C. Circuit and again before the Supreme Court.”).  Compare HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, HABEAS WORKS:  FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO HANDLE GUANTÁNAMO 
CASES 1 (2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-
web.pdf (“Habeas is working.  The judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia have ably responded to the Supreme Court’s call to review the detention of indi-
viduals at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.”), with BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA 
BENHALIM, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION:  THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS 
LAWMAKING 3 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/
2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf (“So 
fundamentally do the judges disagree on the basic design elements of American deten-
tion law that their differences are almost certainly affecting the bottom-line outcomes in 
at least some instances.”). 
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those standards appears to be an emerging consensus that statements 
elicited through coercive interrogation should not be admitted in as-
sessing habeas petitions. 
In the process of evaluating habeas petitioners’ arguments for 
suppressing statements alleged to be coerced, the D.C. District Court 
has underscored one potential impact of the applicability of the Due 
Process Clause to Guantanamo.31  For example, in Al-Qurashi v. Ob-
ama, Judge Huvelle invoked the two logics for suppressing coerced 
statements commonly identified in the case law on voluntariness:  
first, that basic fairness does not permit admission of the fruits of 
coercion; and second, that involuntary confessions have questionable 
reliability.32  In discussing the first concept, Judge Huvelle seemed 
implicitly to be relying on the protections associated with due 
process, citing a number of Supreme Court cases on the subject.33  At 
the same time, Judge Huvelle’s acknowledgment that a due process-
based approach was in tension with certain D.C. Circuit dicta sug-
gested that such constitutional grounds might, on their own, be in-
sufficient to justify suppression.34  Similarly, in deciding to suppress 
coerced statements in the course of assessing a Guantanamo detai-
nee’s habeas petition, Judge Kessler’s opinion in Mohammed v. Obama 
emphasized the same dual foundations for requiring voluntariness of 
statements.35 
In both cases, the invocation of the Due Process Clause’s re-
quirement that coerced statements be suppressed suggests one po-
tential consequence of that Clause’s extension to Guantanamo:  if 
 
 31 See generally WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 30, at 51–60 (discussing the ap-
proaches of judges on the D.C. District Court to involuntary statements in the context of 
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees). 
 32 Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is also well estab-
lished that in criminal proceedings, statements of the accused ‘that are extracted by 
threats or violence violate the Due Process Clause’ because such statements are ‘inconsis-
tent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 
50–51 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 33 Al-Qurashi, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (citing, among other Supreme Court precedent on the 
required suppression of coerced statements, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Rog-
ers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)). 
 34 Al-Qurashi, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.14. 
 35 Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In the criminal context, 
confessions or testimony procured by torture are excluded under the Due Process Clause 
because such admissions would run contrary to ‘fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’  Brown v. Mississippi, 
297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).  Also, as a practical matter, resort to coercive tactics by an inter-
rogator renders the information less likely to be true.  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
638 (1965).” (footnote omitted)). 
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Guantanamo detainees are entitled to due process protections, then 
the suppression of coerced statements by district courts evaluating 
habeas petitions from Guantanamo would flow directly from the Su-
preme Court’s constitutional precedent, rather than remaining sub-
ject to an evidentiary balancing test involving a mix of semi-
constitutional protections and pragmatic concerns about reliability.36  
(Whether Supreme Court precedent in this area itself constitutes es-
sentially a balancing test is another matter.)  Of course, suppression 
of coerced statements is just one of many possible ways in which the 
applicability of due process could affect courts’ continuing evalua-
tions of habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees:  others 
might include the standard of proof,37 the ability to present and to 
 
 36 By way of contrast, it is worth noting that, in the trial in the Southern District of New York 
of Ahmed Ghailani, the applicability of the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on coerced 
statements does not seem to have been disputed, presumably because the location of 
Ghailani’s trial—namely, on American soil—resolved the issue.  That seems to have been 
the case even though the conduct at issue—Ghailani’s interrogation by American investi-
gators—indisputably occurred abroad.  See United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 
264 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The government has elected not to litigate the details of what was 
done to the defendant.  Instead, it has asked the Court to assume for the purposes of the 
motion that everything the defendant said was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.  Accordingly, this decision, at the government’s behest, proceeds on that pre-
mise.”).  For an interesting discussion of the suppression of coerced statements in military 
commission proceedings at Guantanamo, see David J.R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the 
Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1390–96 (2011). 
 37 Cf. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining to decide whether 
the Suspension Clause requires use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in re-
viewing habeas petitions); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“[Boumediene] left open . . . the standard of proof the Government must meet in order to 
defeat a petition for habeas corpus.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Odah v. Unit-
ed States, No. 10-439 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-Odah-cert-petition-9-28-10.pdf (petitioning the Su-
preme Court to decide “[w]hether a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather 
than a clear and convincing evidence standard, is sufficient under the Due Process Clause 
of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to support a ruling in favor of indefinite impri-
sonment, potentially for life,” at Guantanamo), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).  Note 
that the Al-Odah petitioners appeared to take for granted that the Due Process Clause ap-
plies to them, despite the contrary holding of the D.C. Circuit.  In contrast, see Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Awad-petition-11-30-10.
pdf (challenging the preponderance of the evidence standard based on Boumediene alone, 
without invoking the Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).  Regarding 
the overall significance of standard-of-proof issues in Guantanamo habeas litigation, see 
generally Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas, and Standards of Proof:  Viewing the 
Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 246–56 (2009).  Waxman’s 
analysis suggests that a determination of the applicability of due process to Guantanamo 
detainees would not in itself decide the appropriate standard of proof, see id. at 250–51; 
nonetheless, such a determination still could play an important role as one factor in-
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exclude various types of evidence,38 and the right to cross-examine 
witnesses.  Indeed, to the extent that the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause is thought to offer the same protections against the 
federal government offered against the state governments by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,39 finding the Due 
Process Clause applicable to Guantanamo would essentially carry with 
it the rest of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights. 
More specifically, a second consequence of the potential applica-
bility of the Due Process Clause to Guantanamo would be the narrow-
ing of the executive branch’s discretion in resettling detainees 
cleared for release.  Indeed, as will be discussed below, the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s post-Boumediene statement of the inapplicability of due process 
to Guantanamo emerged in precisely this context, as Uighur detai-
nees long cleared for release but lacking a viable destination for re-
settlement sought entry to the United States.40  Other detainees also 
have objected to the destinations in which the United States has in-
tended to resettle them.41  If due process were found applicable to 
 
fluencing the standard deemed appropriate.  For a thorough assessment of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s approach to this issue, see Vladeck, supra note 26, at 12–17. 
 38 Cf. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010), 
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Awad-
petition-11-30-10.pdf (challenging the admission of hearsay in habeas proceedings 
brought by Guantanamo detainees), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 3, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-349 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-Odah-cert-petition-9-
28-10.pdf (petitioning the Supreme Court to halt “the indiscriminate admission of hear-
say” by the lower courts in habeas proceedings brought by Guantanamo detainees), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).  Neither petition for certiorari invoked the Due Process 
Clause on this point, but a finding of due process’s applicability to Guantanamo surely 
would have bolstered their shared argument. 
 39 But see Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that, despite 
the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment jury right via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“[t]he right to jury trial is not, however, converted into a procedural due process right by 
incorporation,” meaning that the content of the right as incorporated against the states is 
not necessarily applicable in identical fashion against the federal government). 
 40 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated by Kiyemba v. Obama, 
559 U.S. at 1 (2010), reinstated by Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).  For a helpful overview of the Kiyemba litigation, see Vladeck, supra note 5, at 971–
76. 
 41 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia at i, Khadr v. Obama, No. 10-751 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2010) (petitioning the Su-
preme Court to decide “[w]hether, in a habeas corpus action brought by an individual 
held in United States territory, including Guantánamo, . . . Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008), the Suspension Clause, and the Due Process Clause permit[] the district 
court to give conclusive effect to the government’s assertion that the individual is unlikely 
to be tortured if transferred to a particular country”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011); 
see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia at i, Mohammed v. Obama, No. 10-746 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2010) (petitioning 
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such individuals, then their constitutional claims to entry onto Amer-
ican soil, or at least to a voice in their eventual destination, would be 
strengthened greatly.  Moreover, the absence of due process rights 
also contributed to the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent holding that the de-
cision of where to resettle the Uighurs was immune from judicial 
challenge by the detainees and, instead, remained at the discretion of 
the political branches.42  If due process were to apply to Guantanamo 
detainees, then their claim to a legally protected voice in their own 
resettlement would be significantly enhanced.  Even short of that re-
sult, the applicability of due process could suggest a temporal limit 
on how long such detainees could be held once cleared for release.43 
Third, former Guantanamo detainees have begun filing civil law-
suits seeking compensation from the U.S. government for their al-
leged treatment while detained at Guantanamo.  For example, one 
representative case filed in the Western District of Washington alleges 
torture and abuse, and identifies as the basis for its cause of action al-
leged violations of the Due Process Clause.44  These civil suits are so-
called Bivens actions in that they allege constitutional violations by 
federal agents, allegations permitted to go forward by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.45  A Bivens ac-
 
the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether, in a habeas corpus action brought by an indi-
vidual held in United States territory, including Guantánamo, . . . Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008), the Suspension Clause, and the Due Process Clause permit[] the district 
court to give conclusive effect to the government’s assertion that the individual is unlikely 
to be tortured if transferred to a particular country”); id. at 16 (“Review is also warranted 
to establish definitively that Guantánamo detainees have a due process right to challenge 
their transfers to another country on the ground that they are likely to be tortured 
there. . . . Due process . . . does not permit the Government to transfer a Guantánamo de-
tainee to feared torture without affording him a meaningful opportunity to challenge his 
transfer on that ground.”).  Note that, like the Al-Odah petitioners mentioned above, Mo-
hammed and the Khadr petitioners appeared to take for granted that the Due Process 
Clause applies to them, despite the contrary holding of the D.C. Circuit. 
 42 Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 43 Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 701 (2001) (holding, in the immigration context, 
that six months constitute a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” for determin-
ing whether a deportable alien’s “removal is not reasonably foreseeable”). 
 44 See Complaint and Jury Demand at 35, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-cv-00591-MJP (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 7, 2010) (“The acts described herein constitute violations of the life and liber-
ty interests of Mr. Hamad in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, which prohibits cruel and inhuman treatment constituting punishment.”).  The 
district court dismissed Hamad’s suit, with leave to amend, based on immunity grounds.  
See Order Granting Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-cv-00591-
MJP (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011).  Note that the Hamad court did not find the Military 
Commissions Act to pose an obstacle to such suits, id. at 3–6, in contrast to a decision 
handed down two weeks later by the D.C. District Court, see Memorandum Opinion at 11–
15, Al Janko v. Gates, No. 1:10-cv-01702-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 45 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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tion is only as credible as the constitutional right that it alleges to 
have been violated; in other words, if the former detainees possessed 
no due process rights at Guantanamo, then they may have no viable 
Bivens actions, either.46  While there are numerous other potential 
obstacles to the detainees prevailing in their suits, including pleading 
requirements,47 immunity claims,48 and potential invocations of state 
secrets,49 if there is no fundamental due process protection at Guan-
tanamo, then the suits may lack even rudimentary foundations.  In 
contrast, if due process does apply, then litigation is more likely to 
move forward, even if the aforementioned obstacles eventually be-
come significant hurdles to plaintiffs prevailing on the merits. 
Fourth, the applicability of due process to Guantanamo could al-
ter dramatically the military commissions that continue to be held 
there.  Because military commissions and courts-martial are not Ar-
ticle III trials but, instead, constitute Article I proceedings, the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, do not 
automatically apply to them.  In 1994, the Supreme Court noted the 
President’s authority to regulate military proceedings and explained:  
“We have never had occasion to consider whether the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, or the attendant right to 
counsel during custodial interrogation, applies of its own force to the 
military, and we need not do so here.”50 
The same uncertainty about the applicability of constitutional 
protections to military proceedings persists more broadly.51  To be 
 
 46 See Ahmed, supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that the application of due process protections to 
Guantanamo detainees would give rise to Bivens actions). 
 47 Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (dismissing for insufficiently meeting plead-
ing standards a Bivens action against former high-ranking officials alleging mistreatment 
during detention). 
 48 Cf. id. at 1947 (discussing qualified immunity as a defense against a Bivens action against 
former high-ranking officials alleging mistreatment during detention); Rasul v. Myers, 
563 F.3d 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (accepting a qualified immunity defense to claims 
made by former Guantanamo detainees), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Ahmed, su-
pra note 24, at 3 (noting that “a damages action would lend itself to the affirmative de-
fense of qualified immunity”). 
 49 Cf. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 54 n.26, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-
1469-JDB (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010) (invoking the state secrets privilege against Fifth 
Amendment claims). 
 50 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.1 (1994). 
 51 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 777 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ques-
tioning whether the Eighth Amendment applies to courts-martial); Weiss v. United States, 
510 U.S. 163 (1994) (finding the Due Process Clause applicable to courts-martial but in 
adapted form); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (finding the Sixth Amendment 
inapplicable to courts-martial and finding Fifth Amendment due process applicable, but, 
in the context of summary courts-martial, finding it not to provide a right to counsel); 
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sure, the current rules for military commissions, enacted by Congress 
and the President precisely to try current detainees at Guantanamo, 
depart significantly from constitutional guarantees, perhaps most 
notably in the admissibility of hearsay.52  If the Due Process Clause 
were deemed applicable to Guantanamo, then military commissions 
might well have to conform to safeguards protected in civilian trials 
in ways that the commissions currently do not.  Moreover, just as due 
process would require suppression of coerced statements in habeas 
petitions in civilian court, so, too, might due process require suppres-
sion of those statements in military commissions, in contrast to the 
ruling of at least one military commission admitting such state-
ments.53  In light of the Obama Administration’s announcement that, 
after congressional urging, military commissions will recommence at 
Guantanamo,54 the potential consequences of finding due process 
applicable to those proceedings are particularly salient and signifi-
cant. 
Other effects on ongoing litigation of an extension of due process 
rights to Guantanamo are conceivable.  Moreover, extending due 
process to Guantanamo could have an impact outside of courtrooms:  
the daily treatment of detainees might well have to change, with po-
tentially freer access to counsel and to outside information,55 as well 
as the provision of other measures generally afforded to those held in 
pre-trial detention on American soil.  Simply put, deriving from Bou-
mediene an understanding of whether the Due Process Clause accom-
panies the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo is not just a fascinating 
question of constitutional law:  it is also a pressing issue for which the 
legal and practical stakes are sizable.56 
 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (finding the First Amendment applicable to the mili-
tary but in adapted form). 
 52 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 949a(b)(3)(d), 123 Stat. 2190, 
2582–83 (2009) (permitting in military commission proceedings certain uses of hearsay 
“not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general 
courts-martial”). 
 53 See United States v. Khadr, D-094, D-111 (Guantanamo Military Commission Aug. 17, 
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/D94-D111.pdf (denying the defense’s 
motion to suppress statements made by the then-teenage accused after interrogators 
threatened him with indefinite detention and rape). 
 54 See Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for Guantanamo Trials To 
Resume, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A19. 
 55 See generally David Cole, What To Do About Guantanamo?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 14, 2010, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/what-do-about-
guantanamo/ (discussing Guantanamo detainees’ restrictions on access to counsel and 
outside information). 
 56 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, 20, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, No. 11-7020 (U.S. Oct. 
24, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/al-
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This Article’s analysis treats the Due Process Clause much as the 
Supreme Court treated the Suspension Clause in Boumediene:  as a bi-
nary on/off switch.  That is, even as the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that “the Suspension Clause does not resist innovation in the 
field of habeas corpus,”57 the Court’s bottom-line holding was that the 
Suspension Clause was fundamentally “on” for detainees at Guanta-
namo:  as quoted above, the Court held “that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”58  Even more so than 
habeas relief, due process cannot be reduced to a binary on-or-off:  
due process is a flexible guarantee, as the type of process that is due 
differs in different circumstances—a fact that the Court recognized in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld as it found due process applicable to wartime de-
tention but then asserted that “the exigencies of the circumstances 
may demand that, aside from . . . core elements, enemy-combatant 
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to 
burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”59  
Hence, nothing in this Article should be taken to suggest that due 
process, if applicable to Guantanamo, must assume any particular, ri-
gidly predetermined form.60  But a threshold question is whether the 
Due Process Clause applies to Guantanamo at all,61 just as Boumediene 
 
Madhwani.pdf (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s denial of due process protections to Guan-
tanamo detainees “profoundly and fundamentally affects all of its analyses” and that 
“[t]he lower courts badly need guidance on the question of the application and scope of 
due process entitlements of Guantánamo detainees”). 
 57 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008). 
 58 Id. at 771. 
 59 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 538 (“[A] 
court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy comba-
tant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.”). 
 60 One might, for example, distinguish between defensive invocations of due process, such 
as detainees’ arguments against the admissibility of coerced statements during habeas 
proceedings, see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text, and affirmative invocations of 
due process, such as the Kiyemba petitioners’ argument for a right to be released on U.S. 
soil, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.  If courts were to find the Due Process 
Clause applicable to Guantanamo, they still might find more compelling detainees’ nega-
tive invocations of due process than their positive invocations.  Thanks to Steve Vladeck 
for underscoring this distinction. 
 61 Especially in light of the incremental approach adopted in the Supreme Court’s Guanta-
namo-related decisions thus far, it is conceivable that, if due process is understood as a 
property law-like “bundle of sticks,” then the Supreme Court might decide the applicabil-
ity to Guantanamo of only one “stick” at a time.  If so, then the full impact of how the Su-
preme Court decides the threshold question addressed here—whether due process ap-
plies to Guantanamo at all—might not become clear for quite some time.  Thanks to Matt 
Waxman for noting this idea.  It is also conceivable that, as a legal realist would be partic-
ularly keen to suggest, a court addressing this threshold issue might reason backward 
from potential implications:  that is, a court first would ask what rights must flow if due 
process were found applicable to Guantanamo, and what rights could flow, especially in 
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addressed the threshold question of whether the Suspension Clause 
applied there in any way.  And it is that question on which this Article 
focuses. 
II.  PRE-BOUMEDIENE CASE LAW 
In an earlier era, the issue of whether the Due Process Clause ap-
plies to aliens detained at Guantanamo would have been resolved 
quickly by any court confronted with it:  case law preceding Boume-
diene suggested that aliens at Guantanamo would be classified as non-
citizens located abroad and, in turn, would not receive due process 
rights under the Fifth Amendment.  In 1936, the Supreme Court 
stated bluntly:  “Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pur-
suance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our 
own citizens.”62  With Guantanamo presumed to qualify as “foreign 
territory,” aliens detained there would not have received Fifth 
Amendment protections. 
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Eisentrager, reject-
ing a lower court’s view that the Fifth Amendment applied to aliens 
detained in Germany:  “The Court of Appeals has cited no authority 
whatever for holding that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon 
all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and 
whatever their offenses, except to quote extensively from a dissenting 
opinion in In re Yamashita.  The holding of the Court in that case is, 
of course, to the contrary.”63  The Supreme Court thus adopted an 
opposite view from that espoused by the lower court, finding Fifth 
Amendment protections inapplicable to the alien detainees being 
held abroad.64 
Forty years later, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to an alien lo-
cated abroad.65  Writing for a five-Justice majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist thought “it significant to note that [the Fourth Amend-
 
the hands of future courts, and, based on consideration of those consequences, decide 
the threshold issue.  Thanks to Travis Crum for this point. 
 62 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
 63 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (discussing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 
26 (1946)). 
 64 See id. at 784–85.  Stephen Vladeck has called into question whether Eisentrager in fact 
found the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to the petitioners, arguing instead that the 
Court accepted the absence of statutory habeas jurisdiction only because it found that the 
petitioners’ substantive claims lacked merit.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdic-
tional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. 587, 595–600 (2009).  As Vladeck acknowledges, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a more expansive understanding of Eisentrager.  See id. at 600. 
 65 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990). 
Feb. 2012] HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS 735 
 
ment] operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, 
which is not at issue in this case.”66  Nonetheless, in what presumably 
qualified as dicta, the Court cited Eisentrager in characterizing its 
precedent thus:  “[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens are en-
titled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of 
the United States.”67 
Significantly, Justice Kennedy concurred in Verdugo to explain his 
decisive fifth vote.  His explanation was context-specific:  “The condi-
tions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and ano-
malous.”68  Justice Kennedy appeared to suggest that constitutional 
protections should be presumed to apply to aliens abroad unless their 
application is, in the particular context at issue, “impracticable and 
anomalous.”  That key phrase emerged from the concurrence written 
by Justice Harlan in the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert, in which Justice 
Harlan declared that, for American citizens located abroad, constitu-
tional protections might not apply if the context made their applica-
tion “impracticable and anomalous.”69  Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence in Verdugo suggested that, in his view, this same test could and 
should apply to non-citizens abroad, too. 
Subsequent lower court decisions concerning aliens at Guanta-
namo picked up on this test.  In 1992, the Second Circuit applied the 
“impracticable and anomalous” test in finding that the Fifth Amend-
ment extended to aliens at Guantanamo.70  The Second Circuit’s de-
cision was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court, whose opinion 
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council made no mention of due process, in-
stead resolving the case on other grounds.71 
A few years later, the Eleventh Circuit also faced the question of 
whether the Fifth Amendment applied to aliens at Guantanamo.  
Taking an opposite view of that articulated by the Second Circuit, the 
Eleventh Circuit declared that, at Guantanamo, “the Cuban and Hai-
tian migrants have no First Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights 
which they can assert.”72 
The D.C. Circuit reached a roughly similar conclusion in its deci-
sion in 2000 in Harbury v. Deutch.  There, the court declined to find 
 
 66 Id. at 264. 
 67 Id. at 269. 
 68 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 69 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 70 Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 71 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 72 Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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an alien in Guatemala to be entitled to Fifth Amendment protections:  
“[A]liens abroad may be entitled to certain constitutional protections 
against mistreatment by the U.S. Government . . . . But [in Verdugo] 
the Supreme Court’s extended and approving citation of Eisentrager 
suggests that its conclusions regarding extraterritorial application of 
the Fifth Amendment are not so limited [to enemy aliens during war-
time].”73  In turn, the court rejected Harbury’s invocation of due 
process rights—but Guatemala, of course, is not Guantanamo, and 
the basis for claiming that constitutional rights are applicable in 
Guantanamo seems greater given America’s unique exercise of con-
trol there. 
As the United States began detaining suspected terrorists at Guan-
tanamo as part of its campaign against al-Qaeda, courts again faced 
invocations of Fifth Amendment protections by aliens located there.  
In 2003, the D.C. Circuit repeated that it did not view the Due 
Process Clause as extending to aliens at Guantanamo.  In Al Odah v. 
United States, the court concluded:  “If the Constitution does not en-
title the detainees to due process, and it does not, they cannot invoke 
the jurisdiction of our courts to test the constitutionality or the legali-
ty of restraints on their liberty.”74  The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Al 
Odah was subsequently reversed on other grounds by the Supreme 
Court in Rasul v. Bush.75 
After Rasul, one D.C. district judge held in January 2005 that the 
Fifth Amendment did not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, explain-
ing that “our Circuit Court has repeatedly held that a ‘foreign entity 
without property or presence in this country has no constitutional 
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.’”76  That decision 
was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in its decision in Boumediene,77 which 
itself was reversed by the Supreme Court.78 
Also in January 2005, another D.C. district judge reached the op-
posite conclusion regarding Guantanamo, finding that “the detainees 
 
 73 Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 603–04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
 74 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); see also 
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Al Odah for the “conclu[sion] 
that detainees were not entitled to due process”), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (remand-
ing “for further consideration in light of Boumediene v. Bush”). 
 75 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 76 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 77 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 78 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798. 
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have fundamental rights to due process.”79  The court applied Justice 
Kennedy’s “impracticable and anomalous” test and reached the same 
conclusion regarding Guantanamo that the Second Circuit had 
reached in 1992:  “There would be nothing impracticable and ano-
malous in recognizing that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have 
the fundamental right to due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
ment.”80  In turn, “the Court recognizes the detainees’ rights under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”81  This decision al-
so was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in Boumediene.82 
In Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit found no Fifth Amendment rights 
applicable to detainees at Guantanamo.  The court acknowledged Ra-
sul but rested its holding on Verdugo and Eisentrager:  “The detainees 
cannot rest on due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment. . . . Although in Rasul the Court cast doubt on the continuing 
vitality of Eisentrager, absent an explicit statement by the Court that it 
intended to overrule Eisentrager’s constitutional holding, that holding 
is binding on this court.”83 
The Supreme Court then reversed the D.C. Circuit but did so on 
the basis of Suspension Clause analysis rather than Due Process 
Clause analysis.84  Additionally, another D.C. Circuit opinion finding 
constitutional rights inapplicable to Guantanamo detainees that was 
issued while Boumediene was pending before the Supreme Court was 
vacated and remanded in the wake of that decision.85 
In sum, pre-Boumediene case law generally suggested that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to detainees at Guantanamo, but the 
Second Circuit and one D.C. district judge held otherwise—with both 
doing so on the basis of the very test for constitutional rights abroad 
 
 79 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 476 
F.3d 981, rev’d, 553 U.S. 723. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 464. 
 82 476 F.3d at 981–82. 
 83 Id. at 1011 (citations omitted). 
 84 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008). 
 85 See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“An examination of the law at the 
time the plaintiffs were detained reveals that even before [the D.C. Circuit’s decision in] 
Boumediene, courts did not bestow constitutional rights on aliens located outside sovereign 
United States territory.  Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, consistent with Eisentrag-
er’s rejection of the proposition ‘that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all per-
sons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and whatever their offenses,’ 
concluded that non-resident aliens enjoy no constitutional rights.” (quoting Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950))), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (remanding “for 
further consideration in light of Boumediene v. Bush”). 
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that won the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court in Boume-
diene.86 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF BOUMEDIENE FOR DUE PROCESS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene unsettled that under-
standing, though the majority opinion for the Court did not speak di-
rectly to the issue of due process rights.  Boumediene held that the 
Suspension Clause applied to detainees at Guantanamo; whether 
other parts of the Constitution applied as well remained, and indeed 
remains, unclear. 
Reaching constitutional issues avoided in Rasul and Hamdan, 
Boumediene announced the application of the Suspension Clause to 
detainees at Guantanamo.87  Much of the Court’s analysis sounded 
distinctly Suspension Clause-specific, emphasizing the unique impor-
tance of the availability of habeas relief in order to keep the judiciary 
present and active, rather than permitting it to be sidelined by the 
political branches:  “The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues 
raised by these cases and the fact that these detainees have been de-
nied meaningful access to a judicial forum for a period of years rend-
er these cases exceptional.”88  Moreover, the Court seemed at pains to 
emphasize the narrowness of its holding: 
Our decision today holds only that petitioners before us are entitled to 
seek the writ; that the DTA [Detainee Treatment Act] review procedures 
are an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus; and that petitioners in 
these cases need not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of Ap-
peals before proceeding with their habeas actions in the District Court.89 
 
 86 For comparison to an interesting and complicated line of cases assessing whether the 
Fifth Amendment applies to takings claims made by aliens regarding property located 
abroad, see Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
ability of an Uzbek citizen to recover under the Takings Clause); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. 
Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing whether a Sudanese cor-
poration had standing to bring a takings suit against the United States); and Doe v. Unit-
ed States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 570 (2010) (“Nothing in Boumediene suggests that the Court in-
tended its holding to broadly apply to the Bill of Rights or to the takings clause, in 
particular.”).  For discussion of these cases, their implications, and their relationship to 
Boumediene, see Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow 
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673 (2010); and Steve Vladeck, Doe, Atamirzayeva, and Fallu-
jah:  When Stealth Overruling Produces Incoherent Doctrine, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/12/doe-v-united-states-when-stealth-
overruling-produces-incoherent-doctrine.html. 
 87 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
 88 Id. at 772. 
 89 Id. at 795. 
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At the same time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court also 
emphasized a broader refusal to permit judicially enforced protec-
tions to be eliminated by the political branches.  This wider logic of 
upholding the constitutional separation of powers and defending the 
reach of the judiciary suggested a reading of Boumediene that was not 
Suspension Clause-specific:  “To hold the political branches have the 
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a 
striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a 
regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what 
the law is.’”90  If Boumediene stood for the proposition that the courts 
should not be deliberately shut out by the political branches, then the 
decision seemed to extend to at least some other parts of the Consti-
tution, especially those frequently associated with judicial enforce-
ment. 
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for 
neglecting to engage in any due process analysis.91  The Chief Justice 
argued that, if the detention review procedures at issue in the case 
fulfilled the constitutional requirements of due process, then they 
could not be unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause; and, 
moreover, that those procedures must have fulfilled the requirements 
of due process in that they satisfied the presumably higher standards 
owed to American citizens located on American soil, as articulated by 
the Supreme Court four years earlier in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld92 in a plu-
rality opinion that Justice Kennedy himself joined.  Chief Justice Ro-
berts pointed specifically to the majority’s lack of due process analy-
sis:  “The majority expressly declines to decide whether the CSRT 
procedures, coupled with Article III review, satisfy due process.”93  
Then, applying the framework announced in Hamdi, he concluded 
that “the system we have here . . . is adequate to vindicate whatever 
due process rights petitioners may have.”94  For Chief Justice Roberts, 
if the detainees’ due process rights had not been violated, then ha-
beas review simply had nothing more to offer.  Thus, the Chief Jus-
tice’s dissent underscored the disconnect between the abundance of 
 
 90 Id. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 91 The majority was explicit in this respect.  See id. at 785 (“[W]e make no judgment whether 
the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards . . . .”); see also Neuman, 
supra note 5, at 574 (noting that in Boumediene “the Supreme Court found that the Guan-
tanamo detainees were protected by the Suspension Clause without first inquiring wheth-
er they had rights under the Due Process Clause”). 
 92 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 93 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 94 Id. at 808. 
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Suspension Clause analysis and the absence of Due Process Clause 
analysis found in the majority opinion. 
Over the Chief Justice’s dissent, the Supreme Court had con-
cluded that at least one constitutional protection—that of habeas re-
lief—extended to detainees at Guantanamo.  Whether other constitu-
tional rights also applied remained undetermined, with suggestive 
language pointing in rather opposite directions. 
IV.  POST-BOUMEDIENE CASE LAW 
In the wake of Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit faced the question left 
unresolved by the Supreme Court of whether the Due Process Clause 
accompanied the Suspension Clause’s extension to Guantanamo.95  
In Kiyemba v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit read Boumediene as decidedly 
Suspension Clause-specific, holding that “the due process clause does 
not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States.”96  The court explained that the Supreme 
Court “had never extended any constitutional rights to aliens de-
tained outside the United States; Boumediene therefore specifically li-
 
 95 Where possible, the D.C. Circuit has avoided the issue.  When confronted by the issue in 
Rasul v. Myers, the D.C. Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s deliberately narrow holding in 
Boumediene:  “[T]he [Supreme] Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb 
existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other 
than the Suspension Clause.”  563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Having thus suggested 
in passing that the D.C. Circuit did not view any part of the Constitution other than the 
Suspension Clause as applying to Guantanamo, the court proceeded not to “decide 
whether Boumediene portends application of the Due Process Clause and the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause to Guantanamo detainees,” instead resolving the case on 
other grounds.  Id.  The briefs in Rasul presented quite divergent views on the issue.  
Compare Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 7 
n.4, Rasul, 563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209) (“This Court’s assertion in Kiyemba that ‘the due 
process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States’ simply cannot be harmonized with the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in Boumediene.” (citation omitted)), and id. at 9 (“But even if Boumediene’s holding 
were limited to the Suspension Clause, its functional test compels the same result with re-
spect to the Fifth Amendment due process clause.”), with Supplemental Brief of Appel-
lees/Cross-Appellants at 3, Rasul, 563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209) (“[T]his Court’s recent, 
post-Boumediene decision in Kiyemba v. Obama holds that aliens held at Guantanamo do 
not have due process rights, and is controlling authority here.” (citation omitted)).  Simi-
larly, dissenting in part in another case, Judge Griffith pointedly avoided the issue of 
Boumediene’s implications for due process.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 525 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., dissenting in part) (“[W]hether the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment reaches these detainees is simply not part of the inquiry required 
in this case.”). 
 96 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), 
reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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mited its holding to the Suspension Clause.”97  The D.C. Circuit’s de-
cision in Kiyemba was vacated by the Supreme Court98 but then was 
reinstated by the D.C. Circuit.99  Thus, the post-Boumediene law in the 
D.C. Circuit remains that Fifth Amendment protections do not ex-
tend to aliens detained at Guantanamo.100 
One member of the D.C. Circuit confirmed that position in a sub-
sequent round of Kiyemba litigation.  When the Kiyemba petitioners 
invoked due process rights as a basis for possessing some authority in 
determining the location of their own resettlement after release from 
Guantanamo, the D.C. Circuit firmly rejected their claims.101  Concur-
ring, Judge Kavanaugh affirmed his circuit’s previous explanation 
that, even after Boumediene, the Due Process Clause did not apply to 
Guantanamo.  He noted that, “[i]n Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme 
Court held that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional ha-
beas corpus rights” and then explained that “[t]he detainees argue 
that they must possess due process rights if they have habeas rights.”102  
Nonetheless, Judge Kavanaugh’s reading of the D.C. Circuit’s posi-
tion was clear:  “This Court has since stated that the detainees possess 
 
 97 Id. at 1032. 
 98 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010); cf. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boume-
diene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 513–14 (2010) (criticizing 
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion as improperly applying Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). 
 99 Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
100 Interestingly, in the process of the D.C. Circuit’s reinstating its earlier decision, Judge 
Rogers’s concurrence appeared to suggest implicitly the applicability of the Due Process 
Clause to detainees at Guantanamo, while rejecting their particular claims based on it.  
But that concurrence, of course, is not binding law.  Id. at 1051–52 (Rogers, J., concur-
ring) (“Whatever role due process and the Geneva Conventions might play with regard to 
granting the writ, petitioners cite no authority that due process or the Geneva Conven-
tions confer a right of release in the continental United States when an offer of resettle-
ment abroad in an ‘appropriate’ country is made in good faith and remains available.  In 
Boumediene, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the adaptability of the habeas remedy, regard-
less of the reason the underlying detention is unlawful.  The adaptable nature of the ha-
beas remedy is intrinsic to the writ itself, and petitioners’ current circumstances under-
mine their claim that the habeas remedy, even accounting for the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause and the Geneva Conventions, requires their release into the continental 
United States pending resettlement abroad.” (citation omitted)). 
101 Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Government has declared 
its policy not to transfer a detainee to a country that likely will torture him, and the dis-
trict court may not second-guess the Government’s assessment of that likelihood.  Nor 
may the district court bar the Government from releasing a detainee to the custody of 
another sovereign because that sovereign may prosecute or detain the transferee under 
its own laws.  In sum, the detainees’ claims do not state grounds for which habeas relief is 
available.”). 
102 Id. at 518 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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no constitutional due process rights.”103  That remains the position of 
the D.C. Circuit.104 
While the D.C. Circuit has thus held that, even after Boumediene, 
the Due Process Clause does not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, it is 
worth noting a passage from the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 opinion in Bou-
mediene that might provide grounds for reconsideration of this posi-
tion should the issue ever be reassessed en banc.  In that 2007 opi-
nion, which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene, the court of appeals stated:  “There is the no-
tion that the Suspension Clause is different from the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments because it does not mention individuals and 
those amendments do . . . . That cannot be right.”105  In other words, 
at least before Boumediene was decided by the Supreme Court, the 
D.C. Circuit contended that application of the Suspension Clause 
could not be distinguished from application of the Fifth Amendment.  
Perhaps the court might, in some en banc reconsideration of its un-
derstanding of Boumediene, return to that conclusion, though now 
pointing in the direction of recognizing the applicability of the full 
panoply of constitutional rights. 
The D.C. District Court, characterizing the D.C. Circuit’s Kiyemba 
analysis as dicta, generally has been careful to avoid tackling the issue 
of whether the Due Process Clause follows the Suspension Clause’s 
extension to Guantanamo.106  But the law of the circuit currently 
seems quite clear that it does not. 
 
103 Id. 
104 One finds relatively little reliance on this holding in the government’s briefs in Guanta-
namo litigation, perhaps indicating a concern that the holding is a tenuous one.  One al-
so finds that courts themselves are reluctant to rest too much on this holding, instead 
providing alternate grounds for resolving Guantanamo cases “even if” detainees are at 
some point vindicated in their due process claims.  See id. 
105 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
106 See Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[I]t remains uncer-
tain to what extent the Due Process Clause applies to the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay.”); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he Court is spared 
from having to wade into the debate over whether the due process principles recognized 
by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld also apply to a non-U.S. citizen held at Guan-
tanamo.”); see also Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 
Supreme Court precedent on due process rights in the context of evaluating a Guanta-
namo detainee’s habeas petition). 
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V.  POST-BOUMEDIENE SCHOLARSHIP 
While the D.C. Circuit has articulated its understanding of Boume-
diene, scholars also have grappled with the decision.  Marc Falkoff and 
Robert Knowles captured much of the scholarly emphasis in suggest-
ing that “Boumediene marked the triumph of a particular approach:  
the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ test . . . which looks to the particu-
lar circumstances of the case to determine whether the application of 
a particular constitutional provision is ‘impracticable and anomal-
ous.’”107  In turn, they anticipated that the potential application to 
aliens abroad of other constitutional provisions, including the Due 
Process Clause, would be determined using the same context-specific 
analysis. 
Other commentators have remarked briefly on the question of 
whether Boumediene’s logic extends to the Due Process Clause.  They 
generally acknowledge the uncertainty of the answer but seem to an-
ticipate its being in the affirmative.  For example, Stephen Vladeck 
deemed it likely but uncertain that the same considerations that led 
to the outcome in Boumediene would point in the direction of finding 
the Due Process Clause applicable to detainees at Guantanamo:  “It is 
possible—if not likely—that Kennedy’s analysis of the Suspension 
Clause controls the due process question as well, but the importance 
of judicial review to protect the separation of powers was a stand-
alone justification for treating the Suspension Clause differently.”108  
In other words, while the Suspension Clause could conceivably be 
seen as unique, the basic logic of Boumediene seems to apply similarly 
to the Due Process Clause.  Likewise, Gerald Neuman acknowledged 
habeas’ distinctive “right to affirmative governmental intervention”109 
but still anticipated that the Due Process Clause would accompany 
the Suspension Clause:  “The characterization of Guantanamo as ef-
fectively U.S. territory for constitutional purposes probably means 
that the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment apply 
there . . . .”110 
 
107 Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 
DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 871 (2010) (citations omitted). 
108 Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2143 (footnote omitted). 
109 Neuman, supra note 25, at 287; see also id. (“[Boumediene’s list of relevant factors] was tai-
lored to the Suspension Clause and its case law, and would presumably need modification 
to address other rights.  The importance of the habeas right itself was an unlisted factor 
that apparently argued in favor of broader reach.”). 
110 Id. at 286. 
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Benjamin Priester adopted a somewhat different perspective on 
the issue.  He suggested that, if habeas review is to have any substance 
or meaning, the Due Process Clause would need to accompany the 
Suspension Clause: 
Perhaps, like Munaf v. Geren, this is a situation where the writ runs to the 
prisoner but relief is foreclosed on the merits—these aliens, by virtue of 
their capture abroad and lack of any ties to the United States, may have 
no rights which can be vindicated under U.S. law.  Alternatively, if the 
[Boumediene] majority’s primary concern is avoidance of rule-of-law-free 
zones by assessing de facto sovereignty, then perhaps the Due Process 
Clause, not just the Suspension Clause, reaches Guantánamo.  Into which 
of the two prior categories the Guantánamo detainees fall, then, depends 
on whether the rationale of Rasul and Boumediene is really just about ha-
beas or whether it is really about meaningful judicial review.111 
For Priester, the habeas access provided by Boumediene would seem an 
empty promise without accompanying due process rights—though 
perhaps the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan that Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to Guantanamo detainees 
would offer the basis for at least some type of substantive law to be in-
voked in habeas litigation, even if the Due Process Clause were not 
available.112 
More boldly, Richard Murphy and Afsheen Radsan argued that 
the combination of Hamdi and Boumediene demands the widespread 
extraterritorial application of the Due Process Clause.  They wrote:  
“Together, Hamdi and Boumediene give detainees a due process right 
to judicial review of the government’s decision to deprive them of 
their liberty after their imprisonment had started. . . . The logic of 
Boumediene’s five-justice majority opinion is that the Due Process 
Clause binds the executive worldwide—from Alaska to Zimbabwe.”113  
Murphy and Radsan avowed that, “[o]n this view, even if there were 
no constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Guantanamo detainees 
could have argued that the Due Process Clause by itself required 
more protections than the government had given them.”114 
 
111 Benjamin J. Priester, Terrorist Detention:  Directions for Reform, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1021, 
1036 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
112 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006); see also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and 
Common Article 3:  Did the Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2007) 
(highlighting the “Court’s views on the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions and 
specifically that of Common Article 3”). 
113 Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 410–11 (2009). 
114 Id. at 436. 
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Finally, Neal Katyal, who would later become acting solicitor gen-
eral, offered congressional testimony in July 2008 explaining his un-
derstanding of Boumediene.  He encapsulated the decision thus: 
[T]he Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay. . . . It is incorrect to be-
lieve that this principle applies only to the Suspension Clause.  After all, 
habeas corpus exists to protect ‘the rights of the detained by a means 
consistent with the essential design of the Constitution.’  Boumediene’s 
right to habeas corpus would be meaningless if there were no substantive 
rights to protect.115 
Hence, while demonstrating some variety in understandings of 
Boumediene and while admitting the uncertainty associated with the 
case’s implications,116 scholars generally anticipate the decision’s logic 
applying not only to the Suspension Clause but also to the Due 
Process Clause, contrary to the conclusion of the D.C. Circuit.  Yet, 
those scholars’ treatment of that crucial issue has emerged only in 
the form of passing comments, without thoroughly assessing the 
range of possible readings of Boumediene or the broader question of 
how habeas review relates to due process protections. 
 
VI.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Neither the courts nor the commentators have offered a clear, 
comprehensive, and convincing understanding of Boumediene’s impli-
cations for the applicability of due process protections to Guantana-
mo.  Before the next Part of this Article suggests five such under-
standings and specifies the most compelling among them, this Part 
delves into a fundamental underlying question largely neglected by 
jurists and scholars117:  in general, what is the relationship between 
habeas rights and due process rights?118 
 
115 Implications of the Supreme Court’s Boumediene Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cu-
ba:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Neal 
K. Katyal, Professor of National Security Law, Georgetown University Law Center), availa-
ble at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/73. 
116 See Ten Questions on National Security, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5009–17 (2008) (ask-
ing, “Does a terrorism suspect who is not a citizen of the United States have due process 
rights if interrogated outside the territory of the United States?” and suggesting “Yes” 
from Stephen Vladeck and Tung Yin, and “No, with qualifications” from Geoffrey S. Corn 
and coauthors Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson). 
117 One notable exception is Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due 
Process and the Suspension Clause:  A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1361 (2010).  Redish and McNamara’s original and provocative article argues 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause supersedes the Suspension Clause.  As 
they readily admit, “the argument appears never to have been suggested by scholars, 
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As one recent article aptly recognizes, “the relationship between 
the Suspension and Due Process Clauses remains completely unset-
tled.”119  It is a relationship that historical understandings alone can-
not illuminate:  as important as such inquiries are to keeping faith 
with the Constitution, historical explorations have not, on their own, 
been able to settle even the more limited issue of how habeas corpus 
should be conceived in the context of today’s detentions,120 and those 
explorations reveal an even less determinative historical record as to 
how habeas relates to due process generally. 
This Part begins by discussing jurists’ and scholars’ generally brief 
thoughts on that relationship, thus revealing how little attention has 
been paid to it.  In large part, that lacuna has persisted because of a 
sensible presumption that both habeas and due process rights typically 
are available, a presumption that generated little reason to parse 
which particular protections are associated with each constitutional 
guarantee.  Then, reflecting the need for precisely such analysis in 
the wake of Boumediene, this Part moves past the prior commentary by 
setting out five overarching ways of understanding the relationship:  
in the first, habeas rights involve jurisdiction while due process rights 
relate to substantive claims; in the second, habeas rights involve a cer-
tain remedy while due process rights relate to substantive claims; in 
 
much less judicially accepted.”  Id. at 1391.  Regardless of its independent strengths and 
weaknesses, their argument is decidedly contrary to the understanding of the Supreme 
Court as presented in Boumediene, and addresses an issue that is roughly the converse of 
the subject of this Article:  their work concerns the possible requirements of due process 
when habeas rights have been suspended, whereas this Article assesses the existence of due 
process rights where habeas rights have been extended. 
118 Treating this broader question as implicated by Boumediene takes seriously the notion that 
Guantanamo-related decisions are not “exotic” but, instead, tackle manifestations of 
deep, persistent issues facing federal courts.  See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, the War 
on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 584 (2010) (contending that 
“neither the problems nor the case law represented in 9/11 detention are exotic”). 
119 Redish & McNamara, supra note 117, at 1364. 
120 See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS:  RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 
12–19 (2001) (reviewing the “sparse” “history of the Clause at the [Constitutional] Con-
vention”); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 26 (“[T]he [Boumediene] opinions spilled a great deal 
of ink about the status of habeas corpus in English and American history leading up to 
the Founding, and Justice Scalia succeeded in part in inducing Justice Kennedy to ad-
dress matters on these terms.  The difficulty with the resulting debate . . . is the absence 
of applicable precedents . . . .”); Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Con-
stitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533 (2007) (using historical evidence to argue that sus-
pending habeas does not make an otherwise illegal detention legal); Shapiro, supra note 
5, at 61 (contending that the historical evidence indicates a conclusion contrary to Morri-
son’s); Tyler, supra note 5, at 627 (“The Convention debates over the proposed Suspen-
sion Clause were quite limited.”); Vladeck, supra note 5, at 942, 959–63 (discussing the 
origins of the Suspension Clause). 
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the third, habeas rights inherently carry with them certain minimal 
due process guarantees while due process rights include minimal 
protections of the type associated with habeas; in the fourth, the Sus-
pension Clause governs structural constitutional relations among the 
branches of government while the Due Process Clause provides rights 
to individuals; and in the fifth, habeas review is an open-ended exer-
cise of judges’ equitable discretion to remedy what they deem to be 
unjust imprisonment. 
A.  Others’ Reflections on the Relationship Between the Suspension and Due 
Process Clauses 
While there is no shortage of case law and scholarship on habeas 
corpus and on due process, surprisingly little has been written direct-
ly exploring the nature of the relationship between the two.121  The 
basic assumption, and an entirely sensible one at first blush, seems to 
be that due process applies to any judicial proceeding, meaning that 
if a habeas action is being adjudicated, then due process—whatever it 
might mean in that context—remains applicable.  In turn, when 
Amanda Tyler writes that “the origins of the Great Writ link it inex-
tricably to core due process safeguards derived from the Great Char-
ter [the Magna Carta] and enshrined in our Constitution,”122 she ap-
pears to suggest that when habeas rights apply, so too do due process 
protections.  Major Supreme Court decisions on habeas have pro-
 
121 The major focus of scholarship on American habeas practice has been on federal courts’ 
review of state court convictions.  See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:  FROM ENGLAND 
TO EMPIRE 308 (2010) (“Due to the distinctiveness of the Constitution in the United 
States, the major questions surrounding habeas corpus since 1789 . . . centered on the re-
lationship of federal to state courts in the handling of state convictions for felony.”); see 
also, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 120 (discussing habeas relief in the context of federal 
courts’ review of state court convictions); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (same); Gary Peller, In 
Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 581 (1982) 
(same); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993) (same).  Such 
scholarship follows the emphases of the case law itself.  See Azmy, supra note 98, at 514 
(noting that “since Reconstruction . . . habeas petitions have almost universally been 
brought as collateral challenges to prior criminal-court convictions or to immigration 
proceedings”).  It seems ironic that today, federal habeas review is primarily post-
conviction review to ensure the fairness of prior proceedings, but, in the Guantanamo 
context, Boumediene imposed federal habeas review because of a distrust of the military 
proceedings themselves, thus emphasizing habeas as pre-conviction review.  Cf. Resnik, 
supra note 118, at 617–18, 675 n.413. 
122 Tyler, supra note 5, at 691–92; see David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty:  Habeas Corpus and 
Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2502 
(1998) (“The Constitution’s guarantees of the writ of habeas corpus and of due process 
are closely interconnected.”). 
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ceeded similarly.123  Because the prevailing assumption has been that 
habeas and due process generally stand or fall together, the few cases 
and writings addressing both habeas and due process have explored 
the nature and extent of judicial protections when both clauses are 
inapplicable124 or, more typically, when both clauses are applicable.125 
That basic connection has been severed in the wake of Boumediene.  
As explained above, Kiyemba announced the D.C. Circuit’s under-
standing that Boumediene extended habeas rights to Guantanamo 
without extending due process protections there.126  Thus, the time is 
ripe for identifying conceptions of the relationship between habeas 
and due process that can account for what habeas means in the ab-
sence of due process.  As a practical matter, that is the current state of 
the law in the D.C. Circuit; even if the D.C. Circuit reverses itself or is 
 
123 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (evaluating a habeas petition alleging due 
process violations); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (same); Frank v. Magnum, 237 
U.S. 309, 331 (1915) (declaring “that it is open to the courts of the United States upon an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond forms and inquire into the very sub-
stance of the matter, to the extent of deciding whether the prisoner has been deprived of 
his liberty without due process of law”). 
124 See Tyler, supra note 5, at 605 (implicitly equating suspension of habeas corpus with “im-
prisonment without due process of law”). 
125 See Cole, supra note 122, at 2484 (discussing the requirements of “the Suspension Clause 
and the Due Process Clause, read together”); id. at 2494 (“[W]henever the government 
detains an individual and bars all judicial review of the legality of her detention, it gives 
rise to a constitutional violation of both the Due Process Clause and the Suspension 
Clause.”); id. at 2503 (“This is not to say that the Suspension Clause and the Due Process 
Clause are redundant. . . . But at their core, both habeas corpus and due process require 
that taking an individual into custody be subject to the rule of law. . . . The two principles 
work in tandem to require judicial review of the legality of all executive detentions.  Bar-
ring judicial review of any such detention would violate due process, and any such deten-
tion must be redressable on habeas corpus.”); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 72–73 (“[T]he 
Suspension Clause, perhaps coupled with other provisions, especially the guarantee of 
due process, imposes an obligation on the federal government to make the essence of the 
Great Writ available in some judicial forum . . . .”).  While Trevor Morrison acknowledges 
certain “interests protected in liberty deprivation cases not only by the Due Process 
Clause but also by the Suspension Clause itself,” Morrison, supra note 120, at 1612, he al-
so examines “the status of the separate due process interest in fair process,” which he 
maintains “need not be displaced by a valid suspension” of habeas corpus.  Id. at 1610.  
Hence, Morrison is interested in due process in the absence of habeas, which he views as 
potentially upheld by branches other than the judiciary and even enforced in courts ex 
post, whereas this Article examines the possibility of habeas in the absence of due 
process, which is the D.C. Circuit’s current view of the rights possessed by Guantanamo 
detainees after Boumediene. 
126 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting decisions that 
“hold that the due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in 
the sovereign territory of the United States” and stating that “[i]t cannot be that because 
the court had habeas jurisdiction, it could fashion the sort of remedy petitioners desired” 
(citation omitted)), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
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reversed, accepting the circuit’s current position for the sake of this 
Article’s discussion opens up the conceptual challenge of under-
standing how these two core constitutional protections relate to each 
other. 
Simply put, existing case law offers no clarity regarding the rela-
tionship between habeas and due process.  The Supreme Court’s ear-
ly, landmark pronouncement on habeas emerged, through an opi-
nion by Chief Justice Marshall, in Ex parte Bollman.127  Yet, Bollman 
involved the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions and did 
not shed much light on the general substantive content of such peti-
tions, instead evaluating the particular requirements for the charge 
of treason at issue in the case.128  The phrase “due process” appeared 
nowhere in Marshall’s opinion for the Court or in Justice Johnson’s 
dissent. 
Subsequent centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence have not 
resolved how habeas review relates to due process protections or even 
offered much clarity as to the nature of the relationship.  Nor has 
such analysis seemed necessary:  with both habeas and due process 
rights generally applicable, there has seemed to be little reason to dis-
tinguish between the protections associated with each.  For example, 
Justice Brennan stated that “there is nothing novel in the fact that to-
day habeas corpus in the federal courts provides a mode for the re-
dress of denials of due process of law.  Vindication of due process is 
precisely its historic office.”129  While Brennan seemed to suggest that 
protecting due process is the central role of habeas review, earlier 
Justice Clark had gone even further in suggesting it to be habeas’ only 
role.  Clark argued that, “[r]egardless of whether or not the scope of 
inquiry on habeas corpus has been expanded, the function of the 
courts has always been limited to the enforcement of due process re-
quirements”130—in other words, protecting due process is the sole 
function of habeas review.  Regardless of whether either or both of 
Clark’s or Brennan’s statements accurately reflected the law at the 
time of writing or today,131 both do little to illuminate exactly how the 
 
127 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
128 Id. at 125–37. 
129 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963). 
130 Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 236 (1953). 
131 Like Justice Brennan, Justice Pitney appeared to adopt a less constrained position than 
Justice Clark’s.  See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915) (denying a habeas peti-
tion after concluding that the prisoner had “not shown to have been deprived of any 
right guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States; on the contrary, he has been convicted, and is now held in 
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guarantees of habeas review should be understood in the absence of 
the protections of due process. 
In contrast to Clark and Brennan’s apparent confidence that ha-
beas review provides, at a minimum, for the protection of due 
process, Justice Scalia, in a 2001 dissent, suggested that the Suspen-
sion Clause provides no substantive guarantee whatsoever in the ab-
sence of other protections:  “A straightforward reading of [the Sus-
pension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to 
(or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely pro-
vides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) 
be suspended.”132  Scalia added, “If one reads the Suspension Clause 
as a guarantee of habeas relief, the obvious question presented is:  
What habeas relief?”133  Scalia’s suggestion as to the Suspension 
Clause’s lack of substantive content emerged in the context of a dis-
pute over habeas jurisdiction and did not command the votes of a 
majority of the Court, so—regardless of its merits or lack thereof—its 
helpfulness for resolving the nature of habeas’ relation to due 
process seems limited.134 
In the end, one must admit that, for all of the courts’ lofty invoca-
tion of habeas review as central to the Anglo-American legal identity, 
precisely what that review, on its own, offers is difficult to articulate.  
Indeed, in the same case from which Scalia dissented, the Court’s ma-
jority explicitly avoided having “to answer the difficult question of 
what the Suspension Clause protects.”135  Perhaps all that can be said 
with certainty based on the case law is that habeas proceedings “can 
vary greatly:  review can range from de novo judicial decision of all 
pertinent questions of fact and law to a highly deferential inquiry into 
only some aspects of prior, nonjudicial determinations.”136 
Indeed, much like jurists, scholars have alluded briefly to various 
understandings of how habeas relief interacts with due process guar-
antees but have offered no compelling and coherent vision of that re-
lationship, instead generally operating on the assumption that both 
 
custody, under ‘due process of law’ within the meaning of the Constitution” (emphasis 
added)). 
132 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 341. 
134 Note that Scalia treated analysis of the due process claims raised in the same case as a 
matter entirely discrete from his analysis of the habeas issues raised there.  Id. at 345–46. 
135 Id. at 301 n.13 (majority opinion). 
136 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2049. 
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habeas and due process apply.137  Some commentators have suggested 
that the Suspension Clause is a functional enabler of due process 
rights, without clarifying exactly what that means.138  One writes:  
“Habeas corpus functions as a minimal guarantor of due process by 
requiring, upon issuance of the writ or an order to show cause, an 
executive detainor to justify the legality of the petitioner’s deten-
tion.”139  One might suggest that this is a casual rather than formal 
reference to the notion of due process, and that the basic notion of 
fair treatment, rather than the actual constitutional guarantee of due 
process, is being invoked.140  But others are quite clear that it is the 
specific due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment that they 
view habeas as securing.  One scholar writes that “suspension oper-
ates as an ‘on/off’ switch for this due process right and possibly other 
portions of the Constitution as well.”141  Another comments that “the 
habeas corpus remedy is essential to the full realization of certain 
other guarantees, most particularly that of due process of law in the 
Fifth Amendment.”142  Note the emphasis here on habeas relief as a 
“remedy”143:  from this perspective, habeas provides a court with 
 
137 Cf. Tyler, supra note 5, at 682 (“Fleshing out the precise contours of how the suspension 
power intersects with the individual rights enshrined in our Constitution is a daunting 
task itself worthy of an entire article.”). 
138 For a brief discussion of the role of habeas review’s assessment of jurisdiction in ensuring 
due process, see Woolhandler, supra note 121, at 598–601. 
139 Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus:  Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United 
States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2005).  Ekeland 
also suggests that the suspension of habeas should not imply the absence of due process 
because the latter would apply to judicial review of whether suspension is constitutional 
in the particular instance.  Id. at 1515.  The judicial reviewability of suspension is another 
debate entirely, see Shapiro, supra note 5, at 77–80; Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Politi-
cal Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 336 (2006) (arguing in favor of judicial review of sus-
pension), but any process that may be due in that regard would be rather different from 
the due process claims of individual detainees under examination in this Article, for 
whom habeas has decidedly not been suspended, as Boumediene makes clear. 
140 Cf. Cole, supra note 122, at 2501–02 (“When the executive takes a person into custody 
and denies access to a court to determine whether the custody is in violation of applicable 
law, whether statutory, regulatory, or constitutional, it has deprived that person of liberty 
without due process in the most basic sense.”). 
141 Tyler, supra note 139, at 386. 
142 Shapiro, supra note 5, at 64; see also DUKER, supra note 6, at 268 (“Habeas corpus was the-
reby becoming a means for the articulation of modern-day substantive due process . . . .”); 
id. at 312 (“As procedural due process expanded so did habeas corpus.”). 
143 See also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 64–65 (explaining that “a remedy of this kind is essential 
to the realization of the due process rights of those in custody”); cf. Cole, supra note 122, 
at 2502 (“Habeas corpus is, of course, the traditional remedy for unlawful custody.”); Fal-
lon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2038 (“[A] grant of habeas jurisdiction not only authorizes 
courts to hear cases, but also confers on those who can invoke the jurisdiction a right to 
the remedy of release unless the custodian can show that detention is lawful.”); Tyler, su-
pra note 139, at 338 (referring to habeas review as “the only meaningful judicial remedy 
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something to do in response to a violation, in the detention context,144 
of due process or some other protection, namely to order release of 
the prisoner.  In a sense, approaching habeas this way makes it seem 
roughly akin to a Bivens action145:  habeas is seen as carrying no par-
ticular substantive guarantees of its own but, instead, as empowering 
courts to respond to substantive guarantees contained in other parts 
of the Constitution and elsewhere, by ordering release (rather than 
ordering the payment of money found in the Bivens context). 
Others, in contrast, have suggested the potential for substantive 
standards to be identified in the habeas context without recourse to 
notions of due process at all.  Baher Azmy argues that Boumediene’s 
extension of habeas “to Guantanamo necessarily carries with it an en-
titlement to substantive adjudication of the petition, even absent an 
entitlement to individual rights based on the Constitution or interna-
tional law.”146  Azmy readily admits that, on this reading, Boumediene 
demanded the construction of habeas standards relatively unknown 
to previous American jurisprudence:  “Boumediene issued a largely un-
limited invitation to the lower courts to create a whole new corpus of 
habeas law in the context of military detention—a body of law that, 
save for several marquee Civil War-era cases, has largely remained 
undeveloped since Reconstruction.”147  While Boumediene may have 
“offered little specific guidance to courts on remand for the adjudica-
tion of factual disputes or mixed questions,”148  Azmy points to the 
“elementary procedural and evidentiary rules” that district courts, in 
responding to Boumediene, have begun to establish in order to resolve 
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees as indications that trial 
judges are “amply equipped” to formulate substantive legal standards 
to govern this relatively uncharted type of habeas review.149  This view 
of habeas proceedings conceives of them as all-encompassing pro-
ceedings rather than as narrower matters that rely upon other consti-
 
for unconstitutional deprivations of liberty”); Woolhandler, supra note 121, at 580 (stat-
ing that “habeas is a vehicle for remedying constitutional violations” and discussing “the 
federal habeas remedy”). 
144 See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 93 (“The remedial-substantive link . . . does not mean that 
the function of the writ is to protect all elements of the due process guarantee, either as 
that guarantee was originally envisioned or as it has evolved over the centuries.  Rather, in 
both its inception and its development (though recent years have seen some significant 
expansion), the writ was understood as the method of challenging the lawfulness of deten-
tion.”). 
145 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
146 Azmy, supra note 98, at 457. 
147 Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted). 
148 Id. at 514. 
149 Id. at 515, 514. 
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tutional guarantees to supply substantive grounds for a prisoner’s 
complaint.  Somewhat similarly, if conversely, Trevor Morrison has 
argued that suspension of habeas corpus leaves intact “the separate 
due process interest in fair process,” meaning that due process, on its 
own, offers protections independent of those secured through habeas 
review but somewhat similar to them in guarding against unlawful 
imprisonment.150 
Finally, David Cole, writing under the assumption that (and in a 
time when) habeas relief and due process protections both seemed 
generally applicable, portrayed the relationship between the two sets 
of rights as rather malleable.  Cole argued:  “To hold someone in de-
tention without affording her a judicial forum to test whether the de-
tention is lawful (in any respect) is the very essence of a deprivation 
of liberty without due process.”151  Cole’s reference here to “a judicial 
forum” seems to suggest that due process itself might provide the ju-
risdiction needed for a court to hear a prisoner’s complaint, thus ef-
fectively providing protections similar to those associated with habeas.  
Cole continued by claiming that “a writ of habeas corpus provides a 
remedy for all executive detentions in violation of law,”152 thus further 
suggesting that habeas should be understood as a remedy.  But Cole’s 
fundamental point seemed to be that we need not discern the precise 
guarantees of each constitutional clause because what we really must 
understand is how they operate when “read together”153—a reasona-
ble and widely shared position in 1998 when Cole wrote, but one that 
leaves unsolved the post-Boumediene puzzle of how to parse the dis-
crete constitutional protections offered by the Suspension and Due 
Process Clauses. 
For both jurists and scholars, the basic assumption has been that 
habeas review aims, at least in part, to uncover and address “impri-
sonment without due process of law.”154  But does habeas review utter-
ly depend on due process guarantees?  And what might it look like in 
their absence? 
 
150 Morrison, supra note 120, at 1610. 
151 Cole, supra note 122, at 2494. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 2495. 
154 Tyler, supra note 5, at 605. 
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B.  Five Overarching Conceptions of the Relationship Between the Suspension 
and Due Process Clauses 
1.  Habeas as Jurisdiction, Due Process as Substantive Law 
One promising view of the relationship between the two constitu-
tional clauses is that the Suspension Clause’s provision of habeas 
rights offers jurisdiction while the Due Process Clause provides a basis 
for substantive claims.  This understanding suggests that the Suspen-
sion Clause ensures that the courthouse doors are not shut to an in-
dividual who has been detained by the executive branch and does so 
by providing jurisdiction for the court to hear from the detainee.  On 
this conception, the Suspension Clause offers no grounds for the 
content of the detainee’s complaint or for judicial remedies in re-
sponse:  it simply provides a basis for guaranteeing that the detainee 
can be heard by a judge.  The substantive grounds for a detainee to 
challenge the executive branch’s detention and for a judge to author-
ize a remedy must come from elsewhere, whether the Constitution, 
the common law, or a statute.155  The Due Process Clause, of course, 
would constitute a significant source of such substantive grounds for 
a habeas petition. 
The Supreme Court appeared to tilt toward this jurisdictional un-
derstanding of habeas in the Court’s unanimous opinion in Munaf v. 
Geren,156 handed down on the same day as Boumediene.  In Munaf, the 
Court found that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to two Amer-
ican citizens held by coalition forces in Iraq but that, on the merits, 
they were not entitled to the relief sought, namely the blocking of 
their transfer to Iraqi law enforcement.  The Court thus simulta-
neously concluded that “United States courts have jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of American citizens challeng-
ing their detention in Iraq” and that “[u]nder circumstances such as 
those presented here, however, habeas corpus provides petitioners 
with no relief.”157  In a sense, this result seems very simple:  the federal 
 
155 In INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302–03 (2001), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the vi-
olations subject to review in habeas proceedings are not limited to constitutional errors.  
See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344–46 (1974) (rejecting the government’s 
argument that only constitutional claims are cognizable on habeas review and finding 
federal law beyond the Constitution to provide grounds for such review). 
156 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
157 Id. at 680. 
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habeas jurisdiction statute158 provided jurisdiction, and yet the peti-
tioners lost on the merits.159 
On further reflection, however, it is worth considering precisely 
what habeas jurisdiction means in this context.  The Court essentially 
said that the habeas statute had nothing to offer to the petitioners of 
substance—no release, certainly, but also no prevention of their 
transfer to Iraqi custody—but it did offer one thing:  jurisdiction.  In 
other words, habeas review got these petitioners (or at least their law-
yers) into an American courtroom, even if the substance of that re-
view proved fruitless for them. 
Hence, for the Court (1) to refer to district courts’ “habeas juris-
diction,”160 (2) to distinguish jurisdictional issues from “the merits of 
the underlying habeas petition,”161 and ultimately (3) to conclude 
“that the power of the writ ought not to be exercised”162 is at least to 
suggest that habeas has a jurisdictional function discrete from the 
substantive claims made in a habeas petition.  The Munaf petitioners 
grounded their substantive claims in the Due Process Clause and the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, and lost.163  The 
Court’s treatment of their jurisdictional claim to habeas review as a 
threshold matter and of their substantive claims as discrete grounds 
for analysis points toward a particular understanding of the relation-
ship between habeas and due process:  the Suspension Clause pro-
vides jurisdiction for a prisoner, while the Due Process Clause acts as 
an important source of substantive claims that the prisoner can make.  
To the extent that Munaf stands for the Court’s approval of this sharp 
distinction between the jurisdiction and the substance of a habeas pe-
tition, Munaf may prove a far more consequential decision than was 
apparent when it was handed down.  At the very least, Munaf’s treat-
 
158 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
159 This result was thus roughly akin to what occurred in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 
(1942), even though the Munaf Court never cited Quirin:  the Supreme Court found ju-
risdiction to entertain the habeas petition, but then denied relief on the merits.  I am 
grateful to Sophie Brill for pointing out this similarity. 
160 Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689. 
161 Id. at 691. 
162 Id. at 692. 
163 See id. (“The habeas petitioners argue that the writ should be granted in their cases be-
cause they have ‘a legally enforceable right’ not to be transferred to Iraqi authority for 
criminal proceedings under both the Due Process Clause and the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARR Act), div. G, 112 Stat. 2681-761, and because they 
are innocent civilians who have been unlawfully detained by the United States in violation 
of the Due Process Clause. . . . We accordingly hold that the detainees’ claims do not state 
grounds upon which habeas relief may be granted, that the habeas petitions should have 
been promptly dismissed, and that no injunction should have been entered.”). 
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ment of habeas and due process as distinctively linked stands in some 
tension with Boumediene’s treatment of the Suspension Clause as a 
discrete and separable constitutional protection. 
For habeas to provide “just” jurisdiction is, in fact, for it to provide 
something quite significant when one considers the rather unusual 
burden placed on the parties in habeas proceedings from Guanta-
namo.164  A habeas petition challenging detention at Guantanamo is a 
rare form of litigation in which the non-initiating party—in habeas, 
the government—bears the initial burden of proof.165  Hence, once 
jurisdiction has been established, the burden is suddenly on the gov-
ernment to justify continued detention, making jurisdiction in itself 
consequential.  In a sense, habeas jurisdiction acts as something of an 
order to show cause in which the government must make its case for 
infringing the petitioner’s liberty.  Therefore, for habeas to provide a 
petitioner with jurisdiction and then for due process to offer that pe-
 
164 Thanks to Steve Vladeck for calling this important point to my attention and for directing 
me to Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, which argues that 
“under traditional habeas principles the government bears the burden of establishing, as 
a matter of fact and law, that the detainees are enemy combatants and therefore fall with-
in the scope of the government’s detention power.”  Id. at 1169. 
165 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 4858241, at *3 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order) (“The government bears the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful.”), amended 
sub nom. Zadran v. Bush, No. 05-CV-2367, 2009 WL 489083, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2009).  
Judges of the D.C. District Court have generally followed this instruction from Judge Ho-
gan’s Case Management Order.  See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–54 
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 611 
F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 
2d 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009).  In pass-
ing, the D.C. Circuit may have intended to express its doubt as to whether placing the 
burden on the government is, in fact, necessary, as the court of appeals emphasized that 
“the burden in some domestic circumstances has been placed on the petitioner to prove his 
case under a clear and convincing standard.”  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 
(D.C. Cir. 2010).  On another occasion, the D.C. Circuit noted that Boumediene may have 
suggested that Guantanamo petitioners should bear the burden of proof.  Al-Adahi v. 
Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “Boumediene held only 
that the ‘extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases is a matter to 
be determined’” and adding in a footnote that “[e]arlier in the opinion the Court 
seemed to put the burden on the detainee:  the Court stated that ‘the privilege of habeas 
corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being 
held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation” of relevant law.’” (quoting 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787, 728–29 (2008))).  The government has accepted 
the idea that it should bear the burden of proof in Guantanamo habeas proceedings.  See 
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 16, Al Odah, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-439), 
2011 WL 119343 (“[I]n the unique circumstances of the proceedings here, it is appropri-
ate for the government to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and not to apply the general habeas rule that a petitioner bears the burden to demon-
strate his entitlement to the writ.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).  For succinct back-
ground on this issue, see Waxman, supra note 37, at 247–48. 
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titioner substantive grounds for challenging his detention offers a po-
tent challenge to the government. 
2.  Habeas as Remedy, Due Process as Substantive Law 
Second, and in a slight variation on the conception just offered, 
habeas review might offer not jurisdiction (or not only jurisdiction) 
but a remedy for violations of the substantive guarantees found in 
protections such as the Due Process Clause.  This conception in effect 
encompasses the idea of habeas providing jurisdiction:  by offering a 
remedy, habeas review implicitly would provide the grounds for juris-
diction to hear the prisoner’s cause of action that, if successful, would 
entitle the prisoner to that remedy. 
Justice Scalia presented a variant of this idea in his dissent in 
Hamdi.166  He distinguished between due process as a substantive right 
and habeas as what he called “the instrument” for its defense:  “The 
two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due process as the 
right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due 
process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—
found expression in the Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension 
Clauses.”167  This understanding effectively treated habeas as a remedy 
for due process violations and one that presumed jurisdiction in or-
der to make the remedy available.  As Scalia wrote, detention-related 
“due process rights have historically been vindicated by the writ of 
habeas corpus.”168  In turn, habeas might offer a vehicle for remedy-
ing violations inflicted on prisoners, including violations of the Due 
Process Clause, and those violations are identified based on protec-
tions external to habeas itself. 
3.  Habeas as Containing Minimal Due Process Rights 
A third understanding of the relationship between the Suspension 
and Due Process Clauses incorporates the understandings of both 
clauses that have evolved, in practice, over time—understandings that 
suggest that the Suspension Clause offers more than just bare-bones 
jurisdiction and that the Due Process Clause provides more than just 
substantive grounds once jurisdiction has been established.  This 
conception of the relationship views the Suspension Clause as inhe-
 
166 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
purposes and historical development of habeas corpus and due process). 
167 Id. at 555–56 (citation omitted). 
168 Id. at 557. 
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rently containing minimal due process protections of its own, short of 
the full-fledged due process rights that would apply if the Due 
Process Clause applied as such.  Though not logically required by this 
view, symmetry would suggest a corresponding understanding of the 
Due Process Clause in which due process itself provides habeas-like 
opportunities to challenge executive action.  That is, one might un-
derstand the Suspension Clause to carry with it certain minimal due 
process guarantees and, as a symmetrical corollary, for the Due 
Process Clause to point in the direction of baseline quasi-habeas 
rights. 
This view understands habeas review as containing minimal due 
process protections of its own.169  Indeed, such an underlying notion 
might explain the tendency, discussed above in Part IV, of D.C. dis-
trict judges handling habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees to 
invoke Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process protections de-
spite the D.C. Circuit’s clear statement that the Due Process Clause 
does not apply to Guantanamo.  The judges’ inclination seems to be 
that some sort of due process guarantees are part and parcel of the 
habeas review that Boumediene instructed those judges to oversee.  As 
Neuman writes, habeas review not only might provide jurisdiction 
and/or a remedy but also might inherently offer “certain minimum 
content” in reviewing detention.170  Overall, just as the right to due 
process might include a basic right to habeas-like review of impri-
sonment, so might a right to habeas review include a basic right to 
due process.  Language from the plurality opinion in Hamdi certainly 
pointed in this direction:  “[A] court that receives a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself en-
sure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.”171  
Then again, Hamdi dealt with a U.S. citizen detained on U.S. soil, so 
it is unclear to what extent the conception of habeas as containing 
minimal due process rights was predicated on those circumstances. 
Though not logically required by it, this view would seem com-
pleted by a corresponding conception of due process as guaranteeing 
quasi-habeas rights to challenge executive detention.  The Supreme 
Court’s prodigious due process jurisprudence makes clear that “‘due 
 
169 Cf. Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (denying rehearing en banc) 
(Griffith, J., dissenting) (“[F]aithful application of Boumediene compels us to provide 
Guantanamo detainees the fundamental procedural protections that characterized the Great 
Writ in 1789.” (emphasis added) (citing Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 522–23 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))). 
170 Neuman, supra note 5, at 541. 
171 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (plurality opinion). 
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process of law’ requires, at a minimum, that an individual receive no-
tice and a hearing before a neutral adjudicator to determine the law-
fulness of the individual’s detention.”172  That would seem to suggest 
that, at least for a prisoner who has never received such a hearing, 
due process effectively requires the basic contours of habeas relief:  
that the prisoner be taken before a judge and permitted to challenge 
whether sufficient grounds exist to justify imprisonment.  In this vein, 
Tyler writes that “the core due process right to demand that one’s 
custodian justify to a court the legal basis for one’s detention . . . . is 
just another means of describing that which is offered in habeas re-
view.”173  From this perspective, the constitutional guarantee of due 
process would seem to contain within it the basic right to challenge 
one’s detention that is more expressly found in a right to habeas re-
view, as a corollary to the idea that habeas review involves certain mi-
nimal due process guarantees. 
4.  Habeas as Structural and Due Process as Individual 
A fourth understanding views the relationship between the Sus-
pension and Due Process Clauses as one between a structural consti-
tutional guarantee and a source of protection for individual rights.  
The starting place for this conception is the placement of each clause 
in the Constitution:  the Suspension Clause appears in Section 9 of 
Article I, amidst the limitations on congressional authority; in con-
trast, the Due Process Clause is found in the Bill of Rights.  The limits 
on Congress, while certainly containing provisions that protect indi-
viduals against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,174 can be 
viewed on the whole as ensuring that Congress does not overstep its 
bounds vis-à-vis the other two branches.175  In other words, Article I 
provides a structure for the three branches of government, and the 
Suspension Clause is one way of ensuring that Congress possesses the 
 
172 Redish & McNamara, supra note 117, at 1376, 1379 (surveying the Supreme Court’s due 
process holdings and the requirements they impose); see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976) (evaluating the administrative review procedures for termination of so-
cial security benefits and concluding that those procedures satisfied due process); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding constitutionally deficient a New York welfare 
program’s termination procedures for failing to satisfy due process). 
173 Tyler, supra note 5, at 682. 
174 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
175 See BADSHAH K. MIAN, AMERICAN HABEAS CORPUS:  LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 145 
(1984) (“Generally speaking . . . Section 9 disables Congress.”).  But see DUKER, supra note 
6, at 131–32 (arguing, based on the constitutional location of the Suspension Clause, that 
it formed part of “a series of limitations on Congressional power vis à vis the states and the 
people” (emphasis added)). 
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authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus but only in narrow, de-
fined circumstances.176  In contrast, the Bill of Rights, as is well 
known, ensured the protection of individual rights in the face of the 
new federal government created by the Constitution.177  Consequent-
ly, understanding the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a 
bulwark of individual freedoms and liberties is entirely consistent 
with its location and function in the Constitution. 
To be sure, the Suspension Clause has clear implications for pro-
tecting individual rights,178 just as the Due Process Clause has struc-
tural importance in ensuring responsible behavior by and among the 
three branches of government.  But implications are different from 
essences:  and the understanding being advanced here is that the es-
sence of the Suspension Clause is structural, whereas the essence of 
the Due Process Clause concerns individual rights.  On this concep-
tion, the Suspension Clause is really about restraining the political 
branches from interfering with judicial review of imprisonment, while 
at the same time empowering those branches to do just that in cases 
of rebellion or invasion.  Habeas review, in turn, is a pure creation of 
statutes and the common law and whatever judges might make of 
them; but it is constitutionally protected from infringement by the 
political branches except in narrowly specified circumstances.179  In 
contrast, the Due Process Clause operates as a constraint against the 
federal government as a whole (including all three branches), and 
regulates interactions not among branches but between individuals 
and the government in all its forms. 
This perspective was articulated by Judge Rogers in her dissent 
from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Boumediene,180 an opinion that was 
later reversed by the Supreme Court.181  Rogers made clear her view 
 
176 At the Constitutional Convention, whether to permit any suspension at all was a subject of 
significant debate.  For a brief historical overview, see Part I of Redish & McNamara, supra 
note 117, at 1367–75. 
177 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(1998) (undertaking a holistic examination of the Bill of Rights, the intentions of its au-
thors, and its history). 
178 The Suspension Clause has even been called “[t]he most important human rights provi-
sion in the Constitution.”  Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the 
Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952).  See generally Eve Brensike Primus, A Structur-
al Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“[T]here is no hermetic separa-
tion between individual rights and structural or systemic processes of governance.”). 
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”). 
180 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994–95 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting), rev’d, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
181 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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that the Suspension Clause is a structural component of the Constitu-
tion governing the relationship among branches.  She first noted that 
“[a] review of the text and operation of the Suspension Clause shows 
that, by nature, it operates to constrain the powers of Congress.”182  
Judge Rogers then elaborated:  “It is unclear where the court finds 
that the limit on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is an indi-
vidual entitlement.  The Suspension Clause itself makes no reference 
to citizens or even persons.”183  She then explained at some length 
why the D.C. Circuit majority was mistaken to neglect the structural 
focus of the Suspension Clause,184 and—anticipating Justice Kenne-
dy’s retort to Chief Justice Roberts—emphasized that the constitu-
tional guarantee of habeas was not necessarily satisfied by procedures 
that met the standards required by due process.185  On the whole, 
Judge Rogers, whose basic conclusion in Boumediene was vindicated by 
the Supreme Court, presented a view of habeas that emphasizes its 
distinctive structural emphasis as governing the separation of powers 
among branches, making the function of habeas very different from 
that of the Due Process Clause and its guarantee of the rights of indi-
viduals. 
5.  Habeas as Equitable Relief, Due Process as Distinct 
Fifth and finally, habeas can be understood as akin to an equitable 
power on the part of courts, thus empowering judges to review the 
basis for imprisonment according to a judicial sense of fairness rather 
than based on any particular substantive guarantees external to ha-
beas itself.  Indeed, this understanding comports with habeas’ histor-
ical origins, as well as with Justice Brennan’s statement that “habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable 
principles,”186 and one might view post-Boumediene habeas review as 
returning to a past in which habeas review did not seek particular 
grounds, such as due process, on which to review imprisonment, but 
instead involved wide-spanning judicial inquiry of the justifications 
for depriving an individual of his liberty by imprisoning him.187  In-
 
182 Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
183 Id.; see also id. at 996 n.1 (“The Suspension Clause is also distinct from the First Amend-
ment, which has been interpreted as a guarantor of individual rights.”). 
184 See id. at 997–98. 
185 See id. at 1005–06. 
186 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (citing United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 
561, 573 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
187 Cf. Goldstein, supra note 164, at 1169 (“[F]or most of the long history of habeas corpus, 
courts resolved habeas claims without undertaking any inquiry into the petitioner’s rights 
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deed, Boumediene itself embraced the idea that “[h]abeas ‘is, at its 
core, an equitable remedy.’”188 
A recent, exhaustive historical study of habeas by Paul Halliday 
provides the context needed to understand the way in which habeas 
relief can be seen as courts’ exercise of equitable authority.  Halliday 
explains that, in England, “[n]o one called habeas corpus an equita-
ble writ.  But this should not keep us from considering the ways in 
which its use was equitable in everything but name.”189  In exploring 
the centuries-old roots of habeas, Halliday finds that particular subs-
tantive guarantees external to habeas relief were not necessary for a 
prisoner to prevail in his petition.  To the contrary, what was needed 
was a compelling tale of the unfairness of the prisoner’s imprison-
ment: 
Habeas corpus is a judicial writ, issued when the justices had been con-
vinced by a story that they should examine more closely the circums-
tances of a person’s imprisonment.  The telling of tales, and the discre-
tion of the judges in deciding to heed the moral of such tales, was quite 
like the process used in most courts of equity.190 
In turn, Halliday finds that habeas review was traditionally an ex-
ceedingly case-specific inquiry, as “justices made an equitable habeas 
jurisprudence that followed the facts of cases rather than rules.”191  
And while, to be sure, statutes could prove relevant in ascertaining 
 
by determining instead whether the jailer had authority to impose the challenged deten-
tion.”). 
188 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995)). 
189 HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 87; see also Vladeck, supra note 5, at 978, 992 (reviewing Hal-
liday’s book and emphasizing “the flexibility, adaptability, and vigor of habeas” and ha-
beas’ character as “a flexible, adaptable, and evolving remedy”).  See generally R.J. SHARPE, 
THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 5 (1976) (“Habeas corpus became one of the principal wea-
pons in the struggle between common law and equity.”). 
190 HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 92; see also id. at 97 (“Habeas jurisprudence was characte-
rized by principles rather than rules, making it an all-but-equitable instrument in the 
judges’ hands.”).  Halliday’s historical work offers interesting historical analogues for the 
Guantanamo situation that confronted the Boumediene Court, see id. at 207–08 (discussing 
cases concerning “the nationality of an applicant for habeas corpus”), with Halliday ulti-
mately suggesting that habeas proceedings provided English judges with “the means to 
control all other jurisdictions, wherever, however, and whomever they imprisoned.”  Id. at 
213.  See generally SHARPE, supra note 189, at 182–93 (discussing, historically, the “territori-
al ambit of habeas corpus”).  For background on judicial forms of action in general, see 
F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker 
eds., 1963). 
191 HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 105; see also Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three Dimen-
sions:  Dimension I:  Habeas Corpus as a Common Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 591, 
595 (2011) (noting that, historically, habeas “decisions are united by a strong impetus to-
wards speedy and pragmatic resolutions based on case-specific facts as revealed by direct 
investigation and a disinclination to pronounce broad rules of law”). 
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whether a particular imprisonment was permissible,192 the basic in-
quiry was essentially an equitable one revolving around the discretion 
of judges. 
That all-encompassing approach to habeas review is one from 
which, as Halliday acknowledges, American courts have departed.193  
Yet, for Boumediene to suggest a conception of habeas review as 
judges’ exercise of equitable discretion is in accord with historical 
precedent, and might even be portrayed as a return to what Halliday 
regards as the zenith, over two centuries ago, of robust habeas review:  
he posits that “the writ’s vigor may have peaked in the 1780s”194 and 
suggests that habeas has historically involved “an ongoing ten-
sion . . . between what is in our law and what we would like to be in 
it.”195  For Boumediene to lean toward the latter would seem to return 
to a conception of habeas review as less rigidly determined by statutes 
and precedent and more flexibly exercised under the equitable au-
thority of judges.196 
Consistent with such a view, the Boumediene Court might have 
been exercising its equitable discretion in assessing the procedures 
that Congress offered in lieu of habeas to Guantanamo detainees 
and, in the end, rejecting them as insufficient.  Indeed, this under-
standing of the majority might provide the best explanation for why it 
was not deterred by the Chief Justice’s complaint that there was no 
basis for finding a violation of the Suspension Clause without at least 
 
192 See HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 105 (“Certainty, like sufficiency, often turned on sta-
tute.”). 
193 See id. at 314.  For one particularly indicative example, consider the following critical re-
marks of Justice Jackson in a draft memorandum:  “[T]here are no rules.  And habeas 
corpus has become pretty nearly a judicial plaything in a game without rules.”  FREEDMAN, 
supra note 120, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
U.S. 545, 580–86 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The history and purpose of the writ of 
habeas corpus do not support the application of the writ suggested by five Members of 
the Court today.  Originally, this writ was granted only when the criminal trial court had 
been without jurisdiction to entertain the action. . . . In expanding the scope of habeas 
corpus, however, the Court seems to have lost sight entirely of the historical purpose of 
the writ. . . . Habeas corpus is not a general writ meant to promote the social good or vin-
dicate all societal interests of even the highest priority.  The question rather is whether 
this ancient writ, developed by the law to serve a precise and particular purpose, properly 
may be employed for the furthering of the general societal goal of grand jury integrity.”). 
194 HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 314. 
195 Id. at 316. 
196 If one views the exercise of equitable discretion as a key judicial function, then there is an 
underlying question of how much this understanding of habeas overlaps with the separa-
tion-of-powers perspective.  As Travis Crum helpfully put it:  precisely what judicial power 
is being “separated” if not an equitable one? 
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determining whether due process had been satisfied.197  On behalf of 
the majority, Justice Kennedy responded:  “Even when the proce-
dures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension 
Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant. . . . This is 
so . . . even where the prisoner is detained after criminal trial con-
ducted in full accordance with the protections of the Bill of Rights.”198  
For the Boumediene majority, habeas review provides something of im-
portance even when all of the constitutional guarantees often in-
voked in such proceedings, including due process, have been pro-
vided to the prisoner.  That additional something might well be an 
opportunity for a court to exercise equitable authority to assess the 
fairness of the imprisonment as a whole, rather than just in terms of 
particular, discrete constitutional rights such as due process.  So 
when Boumediene declared that “the privilege of habeas corpus en-
titles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that 
he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpreta-
tion’ of relevant law,”199 it mattered little that, as noted by Azmy 
above, there was not much relevant law to be applied in this context.  
As long as lower court judges could exercise their equitable discre-
tion to assess detention at Guantanamo, this vision of habeas review 
would be fulfilled.  In the words of the Court, “common-law habeas 
corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy.  Its precise application 
and scope changed depending upon the circumstances.”200  This view 
suggests that habeas review, while perhaps informed by due process 
analysis, is not limited to it:  to the contrary, the majority’s approach 
suggests that habeas review always has independent value, even when 
the requirements of due process have been met. 
In sum, the relationship between habeas review and due process 
can be conceived in five related but distinct ways.  Drawing on those 
five conceptions of the relationship between habeas and due process 
can help us answer this Article’s fundamental question:  should Bou-
mediene be read as anticipating that the Due Process Clause will follow 
the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo? 
 
 
197 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 813–14 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the majority’s “position of evaluating whether the DTA system is an adequate substi-
tute for habeas review without knowing what rights either habeas or the DTA is supposed 
to protect”). 
198 Id. at 785 (majority opinion). 
199 Id. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
200 Id. 
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VII.  THEORIES OF BOUMEDIENE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
Moving from general conceptions of the habeas-due process rela-
tionship to more specific readings of Boumediene, this Part offers five 
possible understandings of the analytical logic of Boumediene, begin-
ning with those pointing most strongly against finding the Fifth 
Amendment applicable to Guantanamo detainees and moving to 
those that point most strongly in favor of such a finding.  Each draws 
on one of the conceptions, explored in the previous Part, of the gen-
eral terms of the relationship between habeas and due process.  As 
will be seen, echoes and elements of all five of those conceptions can, 
at least to some degree, probably be identified in all five of the read-
ings of Boumediene presented below.  Indeed, that overlap is part of 
why Boumediene is such a complex decision and one susceptible to a 
variety of understandings, and, to be sure, the five general concep-
tions of the habeas-due process relationship in the last Part and the 
five narrower understandings of Boumediene in this Part do not match 
up rigidly in a one-to-one fashion.  Nonetheless, each of the broader 
understandings maps most readily onto a particular reading of Bou-
mediene, and those linkages are explored in Section VII.A.  Then, in 
Section VII.B, the two most likely candidates for understanding Bou-
mediene’s implications for due process are explored in greater detail, 
along with the underlying conceptions of the habeas-due process re-
lationship that they suggest. 
A.  Theories of Boumediene 
1.  Boumediene as Suspension Clause-Specific 
First, Boumediene might be a strictly Suspension Clause-specific 
holding that defends the rights of detainees to challenge their deten-
tion.  As mentioned above, the Suspension Clause can be seen as 
unique among constitutional guarantees:  habeas access enables 
those imprisoned to receive at least some form of judicial review, ra-
ther than leaving them entirely at the discretion of the political 
branches.201  Phrased differently, habeas access provides basic jurisdic-
tion in a way that keeps detainees from being shut out entirely from 
access to a forum in which their detention can be reviewed.  Hence, 
 
201 See Resnik, supra note 118, at 632 (describing Boumediene’s holding “that courts played a 
critical role by standing between individuals and the Executive” as the opinion’s “core 
premise”). 
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consistent with the conception of habeas as providing jurisdiction 
and due process as offering substantive grounds for challenging de-
tention is an understanding of Boumediene in which the Supreme 
Court treated the Suspension Clause as unique among constitutional 
protections:  the decision ensured that Guantanamo detainees would 
at least be heard by American judges but did not suggest whether 
those detainees, once heard, would have recourse to argue for subs-
tantive constitutional guarantees as providing content for the detai-
nees’ petitions. 
Indeed, as Priester noted in his analysis quoted above, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Munaf v. Geren202 seems to suggest that re-
cognizing habeas jurisdiction can be significant even in the absence 
of any viable, substantive grounds for relief.203  In the wake of Boume-
diene, and even in the absence of any recognition of substantive con-
stitutional protections for Guantanamo detainees, Human Rights 
First has declared that “Habeas Works,”204 suggesting that extending 
the Suspension Clause alone to Guantanamo may have sufficed to es-
tablish a meaningful opportunity for detainees to be heard by judges.  
Moreover, much of the Court’s opinion in Boumediene reads as Sus-
pension Clause-specific,205 and of course the D.C. Circuit has inter-
preted it as such:  that interpretation may well be correct if Boume-
diene rests on the unique role of habeas access in providing some 
form of judicial access for those detained.  If that interpretation is 
right, then the Due Process Clause might not apply to detainees at 
Guantanamo:  Boumediene was, like Rasul and Hamdan before it, es-
 
202 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
203 Cf. Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2145 (“Boumediene may provide an answer to a question that 
the earlier case law left unresolved:  to show an injury, does the plaintiff have to show that 
he would have prevailed on the merits?  The Court in Boumediene clearly thought the an-
swer to that question was ‘no.’  Rather, the relevant issue is whether the plaintiff might 
possibly be injured by the denial of access to the courts.”). 
204 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 30.  But see WITTES, CHESNEY, & BENHALIM, supra note 
30, at 3 (“So fundamentally do the judges disagree on the basic design elements of Amer-
ican detention law that their differences are almost certainly affecting the bottom-line 
outcomes in at least some instances.”); id. at 6 (“[D]etainees freed by certain district 
judges would likely have had the lawfulness of their detentions affirmed had other judges 
who have articulated different standards heard their cases.  And the reverse is also true.”); 
Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?  Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 769, 848 (2011) (“The persistence of disagreement and unresolved questions re-
garding the substantive-scope issue in the habeas litigation is problematic on many le-
vels.”). 
205 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“Petitioners . . . are entitled to 
the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”); id. at 772 
(“[T]he fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum 
for a period of years render[s] these cases exceptional.”). 
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sentially a case about jurisdiction, but not more, and due process 
might not share the lofty and distinctive status possessed by habeas 
and thus uniquely protected in Boumediene. 
2.  Boumediene as Judiciary-Defending 
In contrast, a second understanding of Boumediene focuses less on 
the detainees themselves and more on the judiciary as an institution:  
this reading of the decision emphasizes its insistence that the courts 
not be silenced or sidelined by the political branches and, instead, 
that they defend the separation of powers among those branches.  
Understanding Boumediene as a separation-of-powers decision is in ac-
cord with a view of the habeas-due process relationship as one distin-
guishing between structural arrangements among the three branches 
and guarantees of liberty for individuals.  From this perspective, the 
real constitutional violation identified by the Boumediene Court was a 
structural overstepping by the political branches, not a deprivation of 
individual detainees’ rights to judicial review—and the analysis con-
cerning the separation-of-powers concerns need not dictate the anal-
ysis governing individual rights that would become the focus of a due 
process inquiry. 
Understanding Boumediene as an affirmation of the role of the ju-
diciary would seem consistent with other jurisprudence of Justice 
Kennedy.206  As Vladeck wrote, “Reading Boumediene, one is left with 
the distinct impression that for Justice Kennedy, at least, the writ of 
habeas corpus is in part a means to an end—a structural mechanism 
protecting individual liberty by preserving the ability of the courts to 
check the political branches.”207  In turn, some of Boumediene’s lan-
 
206 Cf., e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (“By seeking to prohibit 
the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enact-
ment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for 
the proper exercise of the judicial power.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 
449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (invoking separation-of-powers concerns in prohi-
biting the legislative and executive branches from reallocating authority); City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (emphasizing that the separation of powers de-
mands that the proper role of the judiciary be to interpret the Constitution and “say what 
the law is” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
207 Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2110; see id. at 2109 (noting Justice Kennedy’s “repeated allu-
sions to the relationship between habeas corpus and the separation of powers—a recur-
ring (if surprising) theme”); id. at 2111 (“At least where habeas corpus is concerned, the 
purpose of judicial review, in Kennedy’s view, appears to be as much about preserving the 
role of the courts as it is about protecting the individual rights of the litigants.”); id. at 
2112 (discussing “Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the access to courts protected by the 
Suspension Clause is (at least largely) about protecting the courts as such”); see also JUSTIN 
J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA:  THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 205 (2011) 
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guage208 suggests that the decision emerged in significant part from 
an emphasis on ensuring that the political branches could not delibe-
rately operate in the absence of the judiciary. 
The implication of this understanding for due process analysis is 
less than clear:  perhaps the Suspension Clause alone suffices in pro-
tecting a “seat at the table” for “judicial power”;209 then again, perhaps 
more is necessary, and if so the Due Process Clause is the most likely 
next candidate, with its longstanding invocation by American courts 
in both procedural and substantive forms.  If Boumediene was really 
about protecting separation-of-powers principles and affirming the 
role of the judiciary,210 then it seems possible that the Due Process 
Clause might not share the Suspension Clause’s reach to Guantana-
mo, but also possible that it might:  this structural perspective is simp-
ly not decisive for due process analysis.  How the Supreme Court 
would resolve the issue might well hinge less on abstract legal con-
 
(“The point at which judicial sympathy with the political regime stopped and judicial in-
stitutional independence began occurred [in Boumediene] when the Court perceived that 
its institutional power to issue habeas writs was jeopardized and when bare minimum 
judicial functions were jettisoned by the regime.”); Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 385, 388 (2010) (“[T]he strong connection between habeas and the 
separation of powers elaborated by Justice Kennedy is neither obvious nor necessary.  To 
the contrary, it is of recent vintage, and finds roots as much in Justice Kennedy’s views on 
structural constitutionalism as it does in the storied history of the Great Writ.”); id. at 391 
(suggesting that Boumediene “may be best underst[ood] as part of a more general theory 
of separation of powers that Justice Kennedy has developed over three decades in cases 
unrelated to habeas or the Suspension Clause”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas 
and the Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 51 (2010), available at http://www.
uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Vladeck.pdf (referring to “the separation-of-powers 
doctrine’s odd but undeniable centrality to Justice Kennedy’s analysis for the Boumediene 
majority”); Vladeck, supra note 5, at 967 (“Invoking the separation of powers in at least 
ten additional passages, Justice Kennedy’s point appeared to be that the Suspension 
Clause should be understood, in general, as protecting prisoners by protecting the power 
of courts . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  A similarly structural understanding of Boumediene 
emphasizes its limitation on the exercise of government power as a whole, including all 
three branches.  See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 107, at 884 (“[W]hat is striking about 
Boumediene is the degree to which the Court’s holding hinges on the nature of the exer-
cise of government power rather than the rights afforded to the detainees as aliens lo-
cated abroad.”). 
208 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (“The separation-of-powers doctrine, and the history 
that influenced its design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the Suspen-
sion Clause.”); id. at 772 (“The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues raised by these 
cases . . . render[s] these cases exceptional.”). 
209 BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR:  THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF 
TERROR 15 (2008). 
210 See Azmy, supra note 98, at 449 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene 
as deciding “that the indefinite military detentions in Guantanamo violated fundamental 
separation-of-powers principles enshrined by the Suspension Clause”); id. at 466 (“[T]he 
normative justification that most fully accounts for [Justice Kennedy’s] view is rooted in 
separation of powers and a concern about executive manipulation of legal rules.”). 
Feb. 2012] HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS 769 
 
ceptions and more on a practical, empirical assessment of whether 
the post-Boumediene habeas litigation has proven sufficient in affirm-
ing the role of the judiciary in the government’s activities at Guanta-
namo. 
Moreover, a separation-of-powers understanding of Boumediene 
would seem consistent with the Boumediene Court’s apparent disincli-
nation to get involved in the conduct of warfare beyond the limited 
area of detention.  While the judicial power seems decidedly at home 
in overseeing detention,211 it would appear more out of place assess-
ing, for example, the lawfulness of drone strikes launched abroad.212  
That suggests that the Court might use the separation-of-powers ra-
tionale to justify judicial involvement in detention (through habeas) 
but not due process-based involvement in the wider conduct of war-
fare.213 
3.  Boumediene as Internationalist 
A third approach to making sense of Boumediene is to see it as con-
sistent with a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that aim to 
place American human rights practices in line with those of compa-
rable countries around the world.  This understanding of the deci-
sion emerges less from its text than from a comparison with other 
prominent, recent opinions authored or joined by Justice Kennedy.  
His opinions for the Court in cases such as Roper v. Simmons214 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,215 as well as his votes in cases such as Atkins v. Virgin-
ia,216 indicate a concern with keeping American human rights prac-
tices in line with the practices of similarly situated countries.  As 
Neuman noted, “The Boumediene opinion said little about interna-
 
211 Cf. Geltzer, supra note 30, at 114 (“In asserting jurisdiction, as in Rasul, or in demanding 
procedural protections for American citizens detained on American soil, as in Hamdi, or 
in rejecting the proposed procedures and charges for a military commission, as in Ham-
dan, the Court plausibly could claim merely to be delineating the scope of the law, rather 
than circumscribing the scope of the war.  After all, it is the judiciary’s job to uphold the 
law, while it is the political branches’ responsibility to wage war.”). 
212 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing a lawsuit chal-
lenging the alleged authorization of a targeted killing of a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen hid-
ing in Yemen). 
213 I am appreciative to Sam Rascoff for this analysis. 
214 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (finding it instructive that the “United States is the only country 
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty”). 
215 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (noting that other countries have recognized the “right of ho-
mosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct”). 
216 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”). 
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tional and comparative law,” yet “[t]he Court may have been reas-
sured . . . by its awareness of the international human right to a judi-
cial remedy for unlawful detention.  The institution of habeas has 
spread globally,” producing what Neuman labeled the “internationa-
lization of habeas corpus.”217 
If Boumediene was grounded, at least in part, in Justice Kennedy’s 
urge to ensure that the United States would provide the type of judi-
cial relief dictated by global norms, then it seems likely, but far from 
certain, that due process rights would follow.  Much as Article 9(4) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes a 
human rights law requirement of habeas-style judicial review, Article 
9(1) of the Covenant demands what seems to be a rough equivalent 
of due process:  “No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on 
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are estab-
lished by law.”218  Then again, perhaps habeas access would be seen as 
achieving sufficient accord with global norms to make the extension 
of due process rights to Guantanamo unnecessary from this interna-
tionalist perspective. 
This perspective on Boumediene aligns with the broader idea that 
habeas review inherently offers certain minimal due process protec-
tions (and, perhaps, vice versa):  hence, providing habeas access 
complied with global norms not because it offered just bare-bones ju-
risdiction or rectified a structural constitutional error but because it 
produced a mechanism for airing detainees’ grievances as demanded 
by internationally accepted principles.  Still, even if the international-
ist view on Boumediene is properly seen in this light, it remains unclear 
what the decision anticipates regarding due process at Guantanamo.  
Perhaps the same logic of meeting international standards applies 
and points in favor of recognizing due process rights, but perhaps the 
very fact that habeas review itself offers the basics of due process 
 
217 Neuman, supra note 25, at 275–77; see David D. Cole, Rights over Borders:  Transnational 
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 51, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2008/Boumediene_Cole.pdf (“While Boumediene may ap-
pear unprecedented from a domestic standpoint, it fits quite comfortably within an im-
portant transnational trend of recent years, in which courts of last resort have played an 
increasingly aggressive role in reviewing (and invalidating) security measures that trench 
on individual rights.”); Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 46, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
scr/2008/Boumediene_Posner.pdf (“If the Boumediene case is remembered, it will be re-
membered not as a separation-of-powers case, but as one more step in the march of judi-
cial cosmopolitanism—the emerging view that the interests of nonresident aliens deserve 
constitutional protection secured by judicial review.”). 
218 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175. 
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makes unnecessary the further, and perhaps bolder, extension of the 
Due Process Clause to a geographic zone in which the Suspension 
Clause already has made inroads. 
4.  Boumediene as Meaningful Judicial Review 
Fourth, as suggested by Priester, one might question whether 
Boumediene “is really about meaningful judicial review,”219 rather than 
whatever guarantees formally or strictly might be seen as associated 
with the Suspension Clause alone.  If the decision is indeed about 
meaningful judicial review of detention, then extending the Suspen-
sion Clause alone to Guantanamo would seem insufficient for fulfil-
ling the real logic and design of the Court’s decision.220 
Habeas access, as mentioned above, at times seems to be con-
ceived by the Supreme Court as essentially jurisdictional in nature, 
meaning that—as Munaf indicates—a habeas petitioner still needs 
substantive grounds for relief in order to prevail.  In turn, if Boume-
diene aimed to provide judicial oversight of detentions at Guantana-
mo that was more than a mere formality, then some sort of compre-
hensive judicial review would seem necessary—and upholding due 
process protections would be a natural emphasis of that review.  As 
former Guantanamo detainees argued before the D.C. Circuit in Ra-
sul v. Myers, “it is difficult to conceive of a right of habeas without a 
corresponding right to due process.  In the absence of due process, 
by what standard is detention to be judged?”221  There are, as this Ar-
ticle has suggested, conceivable answers to this rhetorical question, 
but its thrust is compelling:  habeas alone might be viewed as allow-
ing detainees into a courtroom, but due process claims—at the very 
least—might be seen as necessary for giving them a basis, once there, 
on which to challenge their detention. 
On this view, undergirding Boumediene was an equitable concep-
tion of habeas review in which such proceedings provide opportuni-
 
219 Priester, supra note 111, at 1036. 
220 Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S. Sept. 
28, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-
Odah-cert-petition-9-28-10.pdf (“In Boumediene v. Bush, this Court held that prisoners at 
Guantanamo, no less than any other person imprisoned by the government, are entitled 
to invoke the writ of habeas corpus to seek their liberty . . . . Such judicial review, howev-
er, is only as meaningful as the procedures that are adopted to effectuate the Great 
Writ . . . . [T]he District Court and the Court of Appeals have effectively gutted this 
Court’s holding in Boumediene that habeas corpus is a fundamental right to which detai-
nees in Guantanamo are entitled.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011). 
221 Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 9 n.5, Rasul 
v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 06-5209). 
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ties for judges to assess the overall fairness of imprisonment.  That 
foundation would seem to explain Justice Kennedy’s explicit confi-
dence in lower courts working out the details of the habeas litigation 
enabled by the Court’s decision.222  If the equitable understanding of 
habeas relief best explains Boumediene, as a reading that emphasizes 
meaningful judicial review would suggest, then further extension of 
due process protections to Guantanamo detainees might be simply 
unnecessary:  judges would seem already sufficiently equipped to 
provide relief by operating under the flexible authority of habeas re-
view.  But more consistent with this reading of Boumediene would be 
an extension to Guantanamo of due process protections so as to faci-
litate judges’ exercise of their equitable discretion concerning detai-
nees. 
5.  Boumediene as the Triumph of the Impracticable and Anomalous 
Test 
A fifth conception of Boumediene seems particularly persuasive and 
is in accord with the understandings articulated by a number of scho-
larly commentators.  This understanding embraces Falkoff and 
Knowles’ notion of Boumediene as “the triumph of . . . the ‘impractica-
ble and anomalous’ test.”223  Therefore, in assessing whether the Due 
Process Clause applies to detainees at Guantanamo, a court would ask 
whether the Clause’s application would be impracticable and ano-
malous.224  This understanding of Boumediene connects with a concep-
tion of the general habeas-due process relationship as one in which 
habeas provides remedies for violations of the substantive guarantees 
of due process.  Hence, as this reading of Boumediene suggests a 
 
222 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (“We do not address whether the President has au-
thority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue.  These and 
other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first in-
stance by the District Court.”); id. at 798 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not 
address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.  That is a matter yet to 
be determined.”).  But see id. at 806 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The nature of the habeas 
remedy the Court instructs lower courts to craft on remand, however, is far more unset-
tled than the process Congress provided in the DTA.”); Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protec-
tion, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1831 (2009) (“The indeterminate and unrealistic breadth 
of the Court’s analysis [in Boumediene] thus comes with substantial perils.”). 
223 Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 107, at 871.  For a history of the “impracticable and ano-
malous” test and a critique of its application in Boumediene and elsewhere, see Christina 
Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution?  Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 973 (2009). 
224 Cf. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the “impracticable and 
anomalous” test to determine the applicability to the Northern Mariana Islands of the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection). 
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pragmatic, clause-by-clause approach to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution that eschews overarching visions of constitu-
tional operation in favor of case-specific and clause-specific analyses, 
it thus anticipates that the applicability of due process must be 
gauged on whether its recognition in a certain situation would be 
impracticable and anomalous:  and where recognition would not be 
impracticable and anomalous, habeas provides the remedy needed to 
effectuate the process that is due. 
Operating under this reading of Boumediene, a court might well 
conclude, in line with earlier applications of that test to Guantanamo 
by the Second Circuit and by one D.C. district judge, that such appli-
cation is neither impracticable nor anomalous and thus should be 
recognized.  Indeed, as the former detainees argued in Rasul, 
“[r]ecognition of the right to habeas corpus, which, as the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in Boumediene, may entail cost to the govern-
ment and require compliance with judicial process, is far more im-
practicable than recognition of the right at issue here,” namely a due 
process-based prohibition on torture.225  If Boumediene in fact makes 
the “impracticable and anomalous” test the basis for all assessments 
of the applicability of constitutional provisions abroad for citizens 
and aliens alike, then the Due Process Clause is likely to extend to de-
tainees at Guantanamo226—not just because courts have come out that 
way before, but because the very operation of the Suspension Clause 
at Guantanamo seems to suggest the general practicability of extend-
ing constitutional protections there. 
B.  The Most Likely Candidates:  Separation of Powers and the “Impracticable 
and Anomalous” Test 
The understandings of Boumediene most likely to be vindicated in 
future case law are the second and fifth discussed above:  the separa-
tion-of-powers perspective that affirms the engaged role of the judi-
ciary in overseeing detention, and the understanding that heralds the 
triumph of the “impracticable and anomalous” test.  The former is a 
 
225 Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 10, Rasul, 
563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209); see also Ahmed, supra note 24, at 32–34 (arguing that the 
practical concerns of extending due process protections to Guantanamo detainees who 
already possess habeas rights are minimal). 
226 Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2094 (“[C]itizens enjoy due process rights whether 
their seizures and detentions occur at home or abroad and . . . aliens enjoy such rights 
when seized or detained within the United States . . . . [W]e believe that Guantanamo Bay 
is sufficiently similar, functionally, to American territory that at least fundamental constitu-
tional rights extend to all who are held there.” (citation omitted)). 
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structural theory of the Suspension Clause that regards it as a defense 
of judicial turf; it is an understanding consistent with much of the 
most crucial language in Boumediene, as well as with other manifesta-
tions of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence.  The latter is an approach 
grounded in a concern with providing remedies for violations of indi-
vidual rights; it also coheres with key passages from Boumediene, as 
well as with the inherently cautious, contextual nature of that deci-
sion as a whole. 
Given that these readings of Boumediene appear most compelling, 
it is worth directly comparing the differing implications of these two 
readings for the potential applicability of the Due Process Clause to 
Guantanamo.  As mentioned above, if the separation-of-powers un-
derstanding of Boumediene is correct, then the same concern with de-
fending the judiciary might not portend an accompanying extension 
of the Due Process Clause to Guantanamo—though it is not entirely 
clear based on Boumediene.  If, by contrast, the “impracticable and 
anomalous” test constitutes the proper understanding of Boumediene, 
then the finding of constitutional applicability appears likely to be ex-
tended into the context of due process.  In other words, the two most 
cogent understandings of Boumediene are not as complementary as 
they initially seem.  Once one examines the underlying implications 
of those two understandings for the relationship between habeas and 
due process, one realizes that the apparent harmony between the two 
readings of Boumediene masks a fundamental tension between their 
implications for a crucial underlying constitutional issue. 
Boumediene’s emphasis on upholding the separation of powers 
would seem to point toward an understanding of the Court’s decision 
that is Suspension Clause-specific and, in turn, that might not antic-
ipate a recognition of due process rights for Guantanamo detainees.  
Boumediene’s plethora of Suspension Clause-specific language could 
square with the decision’s separation-of-powers focus through a rec-
ognition of the unique nature of habeas access for ensuring the active 
involvement of the judiciary.  First, habeas access can be distin-
guished from due process protections if one understands habeas as 
providing jurisdiction and due process as offering grounds for subs-
tantive claims:  once habeas-provided jurisdiction ensures that courts 
are no longer shut out entirely by the political branches,227 then sepa-
rations-of-powers concerns might well be satisfied.  Second, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene spent pages on the multi-century 
 
227 Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Habeas is most fundamentally 
a procedural right, a mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention.”). 
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history of habeas corpus, its centrality to the Anglo-American legal 
tradition, and the role of the judiciary within that tradition228:  while 
recognizing due process protections certainly has become a funda-
mental exercise of American judicial power, there is no similarly long 
and rich history suggesting its absolute centrality in the very nature of 
our jurisprudential tradition.229  Third, due process is not generally 
concerned with structural issues of our constitutional system, such as 
separation of powers, but instead is usually conceived as pertaining to 
the rights of individuals; in turn, its application to Guantanamo de-
tainees would not seem to fit entirely with Boumediene’s separation-of-
powers rationale or an implicit view of habeas review as a structural 
guarantee. 
Despite all of those reasons for thinking that a separation-of-
powers reading of Boumediene does not anticipate an extension of due 
process protections to Guantanamo, Boumediene’s emphasis on 
upholding the separation of powers among the three branches of 
government could conceivably be seen as pointing toward an appli-
cability of due process to Guantanamo.  First, the idea of ensuring 
that the political branches cannot operate free from the oversight of 
the judiciary would suggest that due process guarantees should be af-
forded to those subject to detention:  beyond the access to courts 
provided by the application of the Suspension Clause to Guantana-
mo, the procedural guarantees associated with due process would 
seem the most basic protections that courts might intervene to en-
sure.  Second, upholding due process is often seen as the particular 
province of the courts, meaning that due process provides a natural 
basis on which the judiciary might exercise further authority after the 
habeas authority already declared in Boumediene.  Third, recognizing 
the applicability of due process in ongoing civil suits might, in a 
sense, provide a way for the courts to exercise retroactive review of 
the activities that occurred at Guantanamo before Boumediene:  that is, 
to whatever extent the political branches believed themselves to be 
 
228 See id. at 743 (majority opinion) (“Surviving accounts of the ratification debates provide 
additional evidence that the Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism in 
the separation-of-powers scheme.”). 
229 See id. at 785 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards, it 
would not end our inquiry.  Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists, in Justice 
Holmes’ words, to ‘cu[t] through all forms and g[o] to the very tissue of the structure.  It 
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every 
form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an 
empty shell.’  Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound, 
the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.” (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted)). 
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operating free from the oversight of the judiciary, the judiciary could 
now assess their behavior by allowing to be heard due process claims 
based on pre-Boumediene detention practices.  All three of these rea-
sons for applying due process to Guantanamo would cohere with the 
separation-of-powers logic that suffuses Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in Boumediene, as well as with a structural understanding of 
habeas review as a mechanism for protecting the judiciary’s proper 
sphere. 
On the whole, while it remains unclear whether a separation-of-
powers understanding of Boumediene suggests the recognition of due 
process protections for Guantanamo detainees and former detainees, 
the uniqueness of habeas corpus in the American legal system would 
seem to suggest that, from this structural perspective, due process 
need not follow habeas access.  In contrast, a conception of Boume-
diene as firmly entrenching the “impracticable and anomalous” test to 
evaluate the applicability to aliens abroad of each constitutional pro-
vision does appear to suggest that due process guarantees will follow 
the Suspension Clause’s reach to Guantanamo. 
If the Suspension Clause’s application to Guantanamo was 
deemed neither impracticable nor anomalous, then the Due Process 
Clause would seem similarly situated.  First, providing habeas review 
to detainees who would otherwise have no access to federal courts 
demanded significant costs and resources from the government,230 
whereas adding due process protections merely obliges the govern-
ment to raise the bar for the detainees and perhaps to treat them ra-
ther more like pre-trial civilian detainees:  it thus seems even less im-
practicable and anomalous.  Second, the very fact that, in the context 
of evaluating suppression motions, D.C. district judges already have 
been applying what seem like due process protections231 would seem 
to cut strongly against any argument that due process is impracticable 
and anomalous in this context.  Third, to the extent that recognizing 
some form of due process is necessary to provide the substantive basis 
on which habeas petitions can be evaluated, not recognizing due 
process protections might actually be the more anomalous ap-
proach—especially given this reading’s underlying conception of the 
 
230 See id. at 769 (“[W]e recognize, as the Court did in Eisentrager, that there are costs to hold-
ing the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad.  Habeas cor-
pus proceedings may require expenditure of funds by the Government and may divert 
the attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks.  While we are sensitive to 
these concerns, we do not find them dispositive.  Compliance with any judicial process 
requires some incremental expenditure of resources.”). 
231 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
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habeas-due process relationship as one in which habeas serves as a vi-
tal remedy for ensuring that due process protections, once recog-
nized, are upheld. 
There are, of course, ways to argue that recognizing due process 
protections for Guantanamo detainees would, in fact, be impractica-
ble and anomalous.  Perhaps most persuasive would be an argument 
based on the imperatives of intelligence-gathering in confronting 
“the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age”232:  to the ex-
tent that diverging from what might otherwise be the practices re-
quired by due process could be necessary to gather intelligence and 
prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack, then recognizing due process 
protections might indeed be seen as both impracticable and anomal-
ous.  A second argument might echo and extend Chief Justice Ro-
berts’ dissent in Boumediene:  if Hamdi suggested that an American cit-
izen detained on American soil was entitled to an apparently limited 
form of due process, then it could be seen as distinctly anomalous for 
an alien held at Guantanamo to receive the full panoply of due 
process protections.233  Third, it is conceivable that courts could find 
the extension of due process to Guantanamo, at least in the context 
of civil suits against the U.S. government, to be impracticable not in 
the protections provided to detainees but in the demands that litigat-
ing such cases would impose:  in other words, while it might not be 
impracticable for the executive to abide by the guarantees of due 
process in its treatment of detainees, it might nonetheless be imprac-
ticable for evidence to be gathered, discovery to proceed, and claims 
to be sustained regarding potentially dozens if not hundreds of de-
tainees who might be inclined to sue the U.S. government if such 
causes of action were allowed to go forward.  And, by way of compari-
son, a military appellate court has held that “extending equal protec-
tion guarantees to [alien unlawful enemy combatants] tried before 
military commissions would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”234 
These counter-arguments to a finding of due process’s applicabili-
ty to Guantanamo are substantial, but they seem generally weaker 
than arguments that permitting habeas relief at Guantanamo would 
have been impracticable and anomalous—and the Supreme Court 
clearly decided otherwise on that issue in Boumediene.  In turn, and 
especially given the apparent feasibility of district judges already act-
ing as if certain due process protections applied when evaluating the 
 
232 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752. 
233 Cf. id. at 812–13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
234 United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *46 (C.M.R. June 24, 
2011). 
778 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
admissibility of coerced statements, it seems likely that due process 
would be found applicable to Guantanamo detainees if the “imprac-
ticable and anomalous” test provides the best understanding of Bou-
mediene—unlike if the separation-of-powers understanding prevails, in 
which case a recognition of due process appears less likely. 
The opinion in Boumediene, when read in the context of the case 
itself, appears susceptible to multiple, complementary readings.  But, 
once one digs deeper in order to explore those readings’ implica-
tions for the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and 
due process, tensions emerge, and the different readings of Boume-
diene suddenly begin to tug in opposite directions. 
CONCLUSION 
Before Boumediene, the relevant case law generally suggested that 
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections did not apply to 
aliens at Guantanamo.  The D.C. Circuit has made clear its under-
standing that, even after Boumediene extended the Suspension 
Clause’s reach to such individuals, the Due Process Clause nonethe-
less still does not apply to aliens detained at Guantanamo.  Other cir-
cuits have yet to tackle the issue.  If and when they do (perhaps in civ-
il suits against the government), or if and when the D.C. Circuit 
revisits the issue en banc, or indeed if and when the Supreme Court 
settles the matter, a different outcome may emerge. 
If Boumediene was a habeas-specific decision protecting the access 
to courts of those imprisoned, then the Due Process Clause probably 
does not apply to detainees at Guantanamo.  Alternatively, if Boume-
diene was really concerned with protecting separation-of-powers prin-
ciples and affirming the role of the judiciary, then it seems possible 
that the Due Process Clause might not share the Suspension Clause’s 
reach to Guantanamo.  In another alternative, if Boumediene was 
grounded in ensuring the type of judicial relief dictated by global 
norms, then it seems likely, but far from certain, that due process 
rights would follow.  In yet another possibility, if Boumediene is correct-
ly understood as providing meaningful judicial review, then detainees 
are likely to be deemed entitled to the protections of the Due Process 
Clause.  Finally, if Boumediene makes Reid v. Covert’s “impracticable 
and anomalous” test the basis for all assessments of the applicability 
of constitutional provisions abroad, then the Due Process Clause is 
likely to apply to detainees at Guantanamo.235 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, should the issue reach the Supreme 
Court, the decisive vote is likely to belong to Justice Kennedy, who re-
vived the “impracticable and anomalous” test with his concurrence in 
Verdugo and then saw it command a majority of the Court as the au-
thor of Boumediene:  all four of the Justices who dissented in Boume-
diene remain on the Court and seem likely to oppose the Fifth 
Amendment’s application at Guantanamo, while Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan seem likely to support its applica-
tion there.  All five of the understandings of Boumediene set out above 
offer plausible characterizations of Justice Kennedy’s fundamental 
logic in that decision and, in turn, plausible anticipations of his likely 
approach to the applicability of the Due Process Clause at Guanta-
namo.  The most probable candidates are the separation-of-powers 
approach and the “impracticable and anomalous” test:  the former is 
an issue of consistent emphasis in Kennedy’s jurisprudence, while the 
latter is a test that Kennedy personally revived and made the ap-
proach of a majority of the Court.  If he adopts a separation-of-powers 
perspective, then he might well find that the Due Process Clause does 
not accompany the Suspension Clause, which can be seen as constitu-
tionally unique in its protection of judicial involvement.  If, however, 
he applies the “impracticable and anomalous” test, then the Due 
Process Clause is likely to follow the Suspension Clause to Guanta-
namo. 
If and when this issue reaches the Supreme Court, it will carry 
with it a broader, deeper constitutional question:  what is the rela-
tionship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause?  
Perhaps the D.C. Circuit will continue to explore that issue in light of 
the circuit’s current understanding that the former applies to Guan-
tanamo while the latter does not.236  Regardless of whether the D.C. 
Circuit has weighed in on this underlying issue, the questions that it 
raises—of what habeas review means in the absence of due process 
and how the two sets of protections relate—will present to the Su-
preme Court a challenging and surprisingly underexplored puzzle 
about how two vital sets of constitutional guarantees interact. 
If the Court leans toward a structural understanding of Boumediene 
as a separation-of-powers decision, then the Justices will have to grap-
ple with the underlying implication that, in general, habeas is a struc-
tural guarantee while due process protects individuals’ liberties.  If, in 
contrast, the Court understands Boumediene as the triumph of the 
“impracticable and anomalous” test for assessing constitutional rights 
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abroad, then the Justices will have to consider the corresponding 
suggestion that the emphasis of habeas review is the provision of re-
medies for violations of substantive guarantees emerging from the 
Due Process Clause and other sources of affirmative protection for 
individuals. 
As the Supreme Court contemplates whether to leave Boumediene 
as its last word on Guantanamo or to hear further legal challenges 
mounted by detainees,237 one consideration for the Court should be 
that any further decision would implicate the broader question of the 
relationship between habeas corpus and due process.  Perhaps, for 
the Court, that is itself a reason for letting Boumediene stand as the 
Court’s final, albeit confusing, word on Guantanamo, thus avoiding a 
daunting and difficult issue.238  Then again, perhaps the rare oppor-
tunity for the Supreme Court to tackle such a central and overlooked 
constitutional puzzle should not be passed up. 
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